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A COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION POLICIES AND LAWS INVOLVING
HAZARDOUS PRIVATE DAMS: ‘APPROPRIATE’
PRACTICE MODELS FOR SAFE CATCHMENTS
JOHN D. PISANIELLO*
ABSTRACT
Generally, the world’s largest dams have been erected and managed
by governments, while individual owners have been responsible for pri-
vate dams. Both kinds of dams have experienced technical failures that
have resulted in tragic losses of life as well as disastrous damage to prop-
erty and environment, and this has generated serious concerns regarding
dams’ safety worldwide. In Australia, despite the fact that attention has
been focused on the physical and technical integrity of medium- to large-
scale dams, the smaller private dams have been virtually ignored with
regard to their serious potential and actual problems. Specifically, pri-
vate dams pose threats to downstream communities and environment
in larger catchments due to these dams having potential cumulative
safety dangers. This paper establishes the significance of this problem.
The main issues and concerns surrounding the (lack of) implementation
of private dam safety assurance and environmental protection laws have
been identified and illustrated with Australian case studies. An interna-
tional comparative review of private dam safety assurance policies, laws,
and management practices has been conducted in order to provide a basis
for addressing these issues. The practices analyzed comprise Australia
(including New South Wales, Victoria, and Tasmania), the United States
* The author wishes to acknowledge the Department of Primary Industries and Water of
Tasmania, and especially  Sam Ditchfield, Ludovic Schmidt, and Dr. Alan Harradine for
providing information on the Tasmanian Dams Safety Policy and its progress. The author
also wishes to acknowledge the Australian Research Council (“ARC”) for their ongoing
support of research into private dam safety and for the Discovery Project funding awarded
from 2009–2011 to further research the novel topic of cumulative catchment threats which
have been alerted in this paper.
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(including Michigan and Washington), Canada (including Alberta), the
United Kingdom, South Africa, and Finland. The review/analysis has
identified benchmarks for and elements of “best” and “minimum” practice
that can and do exist successfully to control the safety management of
private dams and minimize both individual and cumulative dam safety
threats within catchments. These elements have led to the development
of models of “best” and “minimum” practice and guidelines for selecting
“appropriate” practice suitable for varying jurisdictional circumstances;
their application is illustrated with an Australian case study. The models
and associated comparative guidance provided here enable appropriate
law and policy arrangements for private dam safety assurance to be
determined and/or checked for any jurisdiction worldwide.
INTRODUCTION1
Serious concern over private dam safety was first evident in Ancient
Babylon nearly 3800 years ago.2 King Hammurabi (c.1800 B.C.), the great-
est king of Babylon, created a legal code containing rules and regulations
relating to many aspects of the operation of dams.3 Failure to conform with
the code attracted severe penalties.4
During the twentieth century, many communities throughout the
world came to rely on dams because they provided many benefits to people,
such as regular farm irrigation and municipal water supplies.5 However,
1 Portions of the Introduction are derived from John D. Pisaniello & Jennifer M. McKay,
International Best Practice Safety Assurance Policy and Cost-Effective Spillway Design/
Review for Small Dams: Protecting Downstream Communities, in NEW TRENDS IN WATER
AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEERING FOR SAFETY AND LIFE 89 (Ugo Maione et al. eds.,
2000) [hereinafter Pisaniello & McKay, International Best Practice]; John D. Pisaniello
& Jennifer M. McKay, Cost-Effective Private Dam Safety Assurance Policy and Spillway
Design/Review, 15 WATER RES. DEV. 261 (1999) [hereinafter Pisaniello & McKay, Cost-
Effective]; John D. Pisaniello, Wu Zhifang & Jennifer M. McKay, Small Dams Safety
Issues—Engineering/Policy Models and Community Responses from Australia, 8 WATER
POL’Y 81 (2006); John D. Pisaniello & Jennifer M. McKay, The Need for Private Dam Safety
Assurance Policy—Demonstrative Case Studies Ten Years Later, AUSTL. J. OF EMERGENCY
MGMT., Aug. 2005, at 15 [hereinafter Pisaniello & McKay, Private Dam Safety].
2 See NORMAN SMITH, A HISTORY OF DAMS 9 (1st Am. ed., Citadel Press 1972) (1971).
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 See id. at 219.
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this increase has coincided with a number of horrific failures worldwide
and triggered serious concerns over dam safety.6 It is true that large dams’
failures are more spectacular and receive more “newsworthy” attention
than those of smaller dams.7 However, small dam failures and in parti-
cular those that are privately-owned are far more frequent in their occur-
rence; consequently, small dams’ total annual costs can be much higher
than the rare (if admittedly more spectacular) failures of large dams.8
Also, past events have occurred where failures of relatively small dams
have caused disastrous consequences. For example: Skelmorlie Dam
(United Kingdom), five meters high with only twenty-four megaliters of
water, failed in 1925 and caused five deaths;9 the Shimantan and Banquia
dams (China) failed in 1975 due to the cumulative failure of sixty smaller
upstream dams and resulted in 230,000 deaths;10 Kelly Barnes Dam
(United States), only 11.6 meters high, failed in 1977 and killed thirty-
nine people;11 Lawn Lake Dam (Colorado), eight meters high, failed in
1982, drowned three people, and caused US $31 million in damages;12 the
Stava Tailings Dam (Italy) failed in 1985 and released only 180 mega-
liters of tailings material but killed 268 people and caused a serious
environmental impact;13 the Evans and Lockwood dams (United States),
around five meters high with eighty-nine and thirty-nine megaliters of
water respectively, overtopped and failed in a cascade manner in 1989 and
6 See generally Patrick McCully, And the Walls Come Tumbling Down, WORLD RIVERS REV.,
June 2005, at 1, available at http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/WRR.V20.N3.pdf.
7 Barry Lewis & James Harrison, Risk and Consequences of Farm Dam Failure, 27 AUSTL.
INST. OF ENGINEERS HYDROLOGY &WATER RES. SYMP. (2002).
8 See id.; see, e.g., O. G. Ingles, A Short Study of Dam Failures in Australia, 1857–1983,
1 CIVIL ENG’G SYS. 190, 190–94 (1984) (showing tables of dam failures in Australia by size
and dam use along with their costs).
9 MARK MORRIS, HENRY HEWLETT & CRAIG ELLIOT, RISK AND RESERVOIRS IN THE UK 5
(2000), available at http://www.environment.fi/download.asp?contentid=16869&lan=EN.
10 See DAI QING, THE RIVER DRAGON HAS COME! THE THREE GORGES DAM AND THE FATE
OF CHINA’S YANGTZE RIVER AND ITS PEOPLE 23 (John G. Thibodeau & Philip B. Williams
eds., Yi Ming trans., 1998).
11 ROBERT L. CRISP ET AL., FEDERAL INVESTIGATIVE BOARD, THE 1977 TOCCOA FLOOD,
REPORT OF FAILURE OF KELLY BARNES DAM FLOOD AND FINDINGS, §§ Authority, Purpose
(1977), available at http://ga.water.usgs.gov/publications/ToccoaFIBReport/.
12 KATIE KELLERLYNN, U.S. NAT’L PARK SERV., ROCKY MOUNTAIN NAT’L PARK GEOLOGIC
RES. EVALUATION REPORT 6 (2004), available at http://www.nature.nps.gov/geology/parks/
romo/romo_gre_rpt_view_low.pdf.
13 Jonathan Engels & Darron Dixon-Hardy, Stava Tailings Dam Failure Near Trento, Italy,
TAILINGS.INFO, http://www.tailings.info/stava.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2011).
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killed two people;14 and most recently, the twelve meters high earthen Ka
Loko Dam (Hawaii) overtopped and failed due to a blocked spillway in
2006 and resulted in the death of seven people and widespread environ-
mental damage,15 followed by Situ Gintung dam (Indonesia), only ten
meters high, which overtopped and burst in 2009 and killed around 100
people in addition to causing widespread damage near Jakarta.16
Wayne Graham studied dam failures in the United States result-
ing in fatalities from 1960 to 1998 and found that the failure of dams less
than fifteen meters high (the typical height range of smaller dams) caused
eighty-eight percent of deaths.17 The failure of small dams less than six
meters high caused two percent of deaths.18 These past events show that
without appropriate design, construction, maintenance, and surveillance,
poorly managed small dams pose significant individual and cumulative
threats that can cause considerable human, property, and environmental
losses to the community. Hence, ensuring adequate management of these
structures is critical and is the focus of this article.
There are many factors in dam design that have changed over
time—including population distributions, infrastructure patterns, meteo-
rological information, engineering methods, and design standards—and
when combined with the condition of the dams, serious doubts about dam
adequacy are raised.19 Unfortunately, no dam can be made one-hundred
percent safe as there is an incomplete understanding of the uncertainties
associated with natural and human factors, materials behavior, and con-
struction processes.20 Therefore, there is a risk of failure at every dam.21
The adverse consequences at some dams are such that risks need to be
periodically checked by professional engineers and, if necessary, reduced
14 WAYNE J. GRAHAM, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, DSO-99-06,
A PROCEDURE FOR ESTIMATING LOSS OF LIFE CAUSED BY DAM FAILURE 8 (1999), available
at www.usbr.gov/ssle/damsafety/Risk/Estimating%20life%20loss.pdf.
15 ROBERT C. GODBEY, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT CIVIL INVESTIGATION OF THE MARCH 14,
2006, BREACH OF KA LOKO DAM 14–15, 84 (2007), available at http://the.honoluluadvertiser
.com/pdf/kaloko/Kaloko-Report.pdf.
16 Death Toll Rises to 96 in Indonesia Dam Failure, ASSOC. PRESS, Mar. 29, 2009, avail-
able at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29937788/; Indonesia Dam Burst Kills Dozens, BBC
NEWS (Mar. 27, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7967205.stm.
17 GRAHAM, supra note 14, at 9.
18 Id.
19 See McCully, supra note 6, at 1, 8.
20 Id. at 8.
21 Id. at 8–9.
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to modern acceptable standards.22 Also, owners must continually main-
tain dams.23
Since it is the role of governments to protect their countries, commu-
nities, and their natural environment, governments must also implement
appropriate policies, laws, and regulations, which assure the community
of owner participation, and protect people from dangerous or compromised
practices involving the management of dam safety. Many countries have
attempted to meet these needs in various ways, acknowledging the value
of downstream life, property, and the environment.24 This to some extent
includes Australia, but certainly not South Australia (“SA”).25 Policy and
law benchmarks, models, and guidelines will be developed here for best
meeting these needs based on a comparative analysis of selected leading
international dam safety assurance practices. SA provides an illustrative
case study of how to use the derived law and policy models and guidelines
to determine “appropriate” practice for any jurisdiction.26
The article proceeds as follows: Part I considers dam safety in
Australia and the main concerns associated with private dams, including
an outline of the policy deficient state of SA. Part II reviews, in detail, the
dam safety assurance practices of selected Australian and international
jurisdictions. Part III establishes general minimum and best practice
22 The potential danger posed by dams is commonly categorized by a hazard rating of
either high, significant, or low. See, e.g., FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., FEDERAL GUIDELINES FOR DAM SAFETY: HAZARD POTENTIAL CLASSIFI-
CATION SYSTEM FOR DAMS 5–6 (2004), available at http://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydro
power/safety/guidelines/fema-333.pdf; AUSTL. NAT’L COMM. ON LARGE DAMS, GUIDELINES
ON DAM SAFETY MANAGEMENT (2003) [hereinafter ANCOLD MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES].
These categories vary only slightly in definition in the different countries reviewed in this
paper. For example, the Canadian province of British Columbia uses the hazard ratings
very high, high, low, and very low. British Columbia Dam Safety Regulation, R.S.B.C.
44/2000 (Can.). The Australian National Committee on Large Dams (“ANCOLD”) classifies
dam hazard as either very low, low, significant, high C, high B, high A, or extreme. AUSTL.
NAT’L COMM. ON LARGE DAMS, GUIDELINES ON ASSESSMENT OF CONSEQUENCES OF DAM
FAILURE 13 tbl.3 (2000) [hereinafter ANCOLD, CONSEQUENCES OF DAM FAILURE]. For the
purposes of this paper, the ratings can be generally summarized as follows: “high hazard”—
failure will endanger many lives in a downstream community and will cause extensive
damage to property and/or environment; “significant hazard”—failure may endanger some
lives and will cause extensive damage to property and/or environment; “low hazard”—
failure poses negligible risk to life and will cause limited damage.
23 See, e.g., British Columbia Dam Safety Regulation, R.S.B.C. 44/2000 § 3 (Can.) (detailing
a dam owner’s maintenance responsibilities); ANCOLD MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES, supra
note 22.
24 See infra Parts II.A–II.F.
25 See infra Part I.B.
26 See infra Part I.B.
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benchmarks in private dam safety assurance policy. Part IV then pro-
vides a comparative analysis of each of the reviewed practices in order to
identify elements of better practice, which together form a model of “best
practice.” Part V similarly identifies the key elements necessary to estab-
lish a model of “minimum practice.” Guidelines for selecting the “appro-
priate” private dam safety assurance policy from the developed models are
then derived in Part VI. A summary of lessons and implications, including
an example application of the policy guidelines, as well as conclusions, are
provided in the final parts.
I. DAM SAFETY IN AUSTRALIA27
In Australia, like most common law countries, owner obligation
exists under the common law of negligence to take reasonable care of
dams according to current prevailing standards.28 In the case of Burnie
Port Authority, the High Court of Australia concluded, “Under those
[negligence] principles, a person [taking] advantage of [the] control of
premises to introduce a dangerous substance . . . [or] to carry on a dan-
gerous activity . . . owes a duty of reasonable care to avoid a reasonably
foreseeable risk of injury or damage to the person or property of another.”29
It is inevitable that any significant private dam will attract the issue of
duty of care because there will be proximity between the dam owner and
the assets of the plaintiff damaged when such a failure occurs.30
The responsibility of evaluating public dams in terms of following
current guidelines has been assumed by most Australian government dam-
owning agencies. These agencies have the task of implementing appropri-
ate action, costing much money, to reduce the risks of dam failure so that
modern acceptable standards are attained.31 For example, in New South
27 Portions of Part I are derived from John D. Pisaniello, How to Manage the Cumulative
Flood Safety of Catchment Dams, 35 WATER SA 361 (2009) [hereinafter Pisaniello, How
to Manage]; John D. Pisaniello, Analysis and Modelling of Private Dam Safety Assurance
Policy and Flood Capability Design/Review Procedures (Aug. 1997) (unpublished Ph.D.
thesis, University of South Australia) [hereinafter Pisaniello, Ph.D. Thesis]; Pisaniello &
McKay, Cost-Effective, supra note 1; Pisaniello & McKay, Private Dam Safety, supra note 1.
28 See Robert Wensley, Legal Constraints in the Use of Risk Assessment, in ACCEPTABLE
RISKS FOR MAJOR INFRASTRUCTURE 23, 27 (Paul Heinrichs & Robin Fell eds., 1995);
Jennifer M. McKay & John D. Pisaniello, What Must the Reasonable Private Dam Owner
Foresee?, MACEDON DIGEST, Summer 1995, at 27, 27.
29 Burnie Port Auth. v. Gen. Jones Pty. Ltd. (1994), 179 CLR 520, 556–57 (Austl.) (per five
of the seven judges in joint judgment).
30 McKay & Pisaniello, supra note 28, at 27.
31 N.S.W. DAMS SAFETY COMM., ANNUAL REPORT 2002/2003, at 6 (2003), available at http://
www.damsafety.nsw.gov.au/DSC/Download/Annual_Reports_PDF/AR%202002_03.pdf.
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Wales (“NSW”) safety upgrades on the Pindari and Warragamba dams
were recently completed at a cost of AU $68.8 million and AU $100 million,
respectively.32 Recent extensive safety studies and subsequent upgrading
in SA have been commissioned for most public dams, for example, Mount
Bold Reservoir,33 Kangaroo Creek Dam,34 and Happy Valley Reservoir.35
However, for private dams the situation is different, and the reasons why
are explained in more detail below.
A. The Private Dam Safety Problem in Australia36
“In Australia, a clear problem exists with private dam safety:
Australia has a large number of relatively small, privately owned dams
(farm dams especially . . . ) and those which have failed number in the
thousands.”37 There are an estimated 480,000 farm dams in Australia.38
In 1992, the Australian National Committee on Large Dams (“ANCOLD”)39
estimated that for NSW alone, twenty-three percent of its farm dams
had failed.40 In Victoria, around 100041 of the 300,00042 farm dams are
32 See id. at 19 tbl.4; STATE WATER CORP., DAM FACTS AND FIGURES: PINDARI DAM (2009),
available at http://www.statewater.com.au/_Documents/Dam%20brochures/Pindari%20Dam
%20Brochure.pdf.
33 See generally TREVOR DANIELL & PETER HILL, UNIV. OF ADELAIDE, FLOOD HYDROLOGY
STUDY OF THE ONKAPARINGA RIVER (1993).
34 See generally LANGE DAMES CAMPBELL (SA) PARTY LTD. & SNOWY MOUNTAINS ENG’G
CORP., REF. NO. SA485, RIVER TORRENS FLOOD HYDROLOGY STUDY (1995).
35 See generally BC TONKIN & ASSOC., REF. NO. 95.0296, HAPPY VALLEY RESERVOIR
EXTREME FLOOD HYDROLOGY STUDY (1997).
36 Portions of Part I.A are derived from John D. Pisaniello & Jennifer M. McKay,
Australian Community Responses to Upgraded Farm Dam Laws and Cost-Effective
Spillway Modelling, 21 WATER RES. DEV. 325, 328 (2005) [hereinafter Pisaniello &
McKay, Australian Community Responses]; John D. Pisaniello & R.L. Burritt, Farm Dam
Safety Accounting and Reporting Policy in Australia (2010) (unpublished conference
paper) (on file with author); Pisaniello, Zhifang & McKay, supra note 1; Pisaniello, How
to Manage, supra note 27; Pisaniello, Ph.D. Thesis, supra note 27.
37 Pisaniello, How to Manage, supra note 27, at 361; Pisaniello, Ph.D. Thesis, supra note
27, at 1.
38 Janine Price, Barry Lewis & Ian Rutherfurd, Water Quality in Small Farm Dams, 28
INT’L HYDROLOGY &WATER RES. (2003).
39 This is the main body in Australia which sets the standard on dam safety. See John
Marsden et al., Dam Safety, Economic Regulation and Society’s Need to Prioritise Health
and Safety Expenditures, 33 IPENZ PROC. OF TECHNICAL GROUPS 1, 1–2 (2008).
40 Status of Dam Safety in Australia, ANCOLD BULL. (Austl. Nat’l Comm. on Large
Dams, Hobart, Tas., Austrl.), 1992, at 9, 11.
41 Id. at 11; K. Murley, Referable Dams in Victoria-Spillway Inadequacy, ANCOLD BULL.
(Austl. Nat’l Comm. on Large Dams, Hobart, Tas., Austrl.), April 1987, at 24–26.
42 P. S. Lake & Nick R. Bond, Australian Futures: Freshwater Ecosystems and Human
Water Usage, 39 FUTURES 288, 290 (2007).
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hazardous. While the costs of private dam failures associated with public
and private infrastructure and the environment are significant, there is un-
fortunately no systematic means of determining this because failures are
rarely publicized and/or documented.43 Pisaniello44 attempted to estimate
these costs in Australia on the basis of thirty-seven available recorded
dam failures45 going back to 1857, finding that: (i) of all the failures, only
a privately owned dam caused loss of life (fourteen lives lost),46 and (ii) the
dams five meters to twenty meters high—this being the typical size range
of significant private dams—represent sixty percent of all the recorded
failures; of these, fifty percent are private dams.47 Thus, some indication
has been provided of the type of costs associated with private dam failures,
and furthermore the need to have policies and regulatory frameworks to
resolve such problems.
A major concern with private dams is that contractors are often
hired by landholders to build their dams.48 “These contractors are, typi-
cally, not properly trained or skilled in the design and construction of
dams. Thus, many private dams are not built to an adequate standard.”49
Also, private owners tend to neglect the need for reviewing their dams and
instead develop a sense of complacency, believing that as the dams have not
failed up to now, then they will never fail.50 The outcome is that no ongoing
maintenance, upgrading or series of safety checks is made on private
dams, and this ultimately puts at risk the downstream communities.51
Another serious problem is that small dams’ individual lack of
safety can lead to cumulative failure during medium to large floods which
can result in severe, destructive, or catastrophic downstream outcomes.52
For example, this occurred with the Shimantan and Banquia dam failures
in China and the Evans and Lockwood dam failures in the United States
43 See Ingles, supra note 8, at 190.
44 See generally Pisaniello, Ph.D Thesis, supra note 27.
45 Failure refers to “a lack of performance as originally intended, which has resulted in
a loss of life and/or substantial costs for rectification” (i.e. more than AU $1 million)
and/or damage to the environment. Ingles, supra note 8, at 190.
46 This dam being the Briseis Mining dam in Tasmania in 1929. Pisaniello, Ph.D. Thesis,
supra note 27, at 2.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 10.
49 Pisaniello, Ph.D. Thesis, supra note 27, at 10. See Pisaniello & McKay, Australian
Community Responses, supra note 36, at 328.
50 See K. C. Webster & R. J. Wark, Australian Dam Safety Legislation, ANCOLD BULL.
(Austl. Nat’l Comm. On Large Dams, Hobart, Tas., Austl.), 1987, at 63, 66.
51 See Pisaniello, Zhifang & McKay, supra note 1, at 87.
52 See id.
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as described previously in this paper.53 This major problem has been dem-
onstrated in a flood study of the large public Kangaroo Creek Dam in
South Australia’s Torrens catchment.54 This particular study discovered
that the peak inflow to Kangaroo Creek Dam would rise fourfold and
cause it to fail, in the event that all the small dams in the catchment failed
simultaneously in an extreme design flood event of only 1-in-200 years,
compared to the flow estimated if the dams remained intact.55 These
small dams’ cumulative failure represented a reasonable assumption and
even more so when a later study concluded that most small dams in south-
eastern Australia would not withstand the 1-in-100 years design flood
event.56 The River Torrens study thus recognized the need for “controlling
the standard of construction of farm dams and their spillways.”57 An added
problem is that global warming is making extreme “flash” flood events
much more likely.58 Consequently Australia is at great risk of experiencing
disastrous and cumulative-style dam failures in the future.
ANCOLD has for some time been aware of and expressed its con-
cerns regarding the problems outlined above and encouraged the States
to implement uniform dam safety legislation.59 There have been, however,
high levels of political ambivalence and subsequently attempts to enact
dam safety bills have not been successful in most states.60 NSW is cur-
rently the only state to have a specific dam safety act,61 and it is only in
recent times that Queensland and Victoria have amended their existing
water laws by introducing some private dam safety regulations.62 None-
theless, despite these three states’ efforts, their relevant policies are not
pervasive because they only address the problems associated with larger,
more significant dams. They fail to consider the cumulative safety threats
53 See supra notes 10, 14 and accompanying text.
54 LANGE DAMES CAMPBELL, supra note 34, at 2–3, 43.
55 Id.; see also Pavel Kazarovski, Farm Dams Do Not Have Impact on Large Floods or Do
They?, 23 AUSTL. INST. OF ENG’RS HYDROLOGY &WATER RES. SYMP. 725, 725–26 (1996).
56 See Pisaniello & McKay, Australian Community Responses, supra note 36, at 332–33.
57 LANGE DAMES CAMPBELL, supra note 34, at 43.
58 See U.N. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SUMMARY FOR POLICY
MAKERS, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 7–8 (Susan Solomon et al.
eds., 2007).
59 ANCOLD first became aware of these problems and expressed concern in its publication.
See Webster & Wark, supra note 50, at 63, 66.
60 Pisaniello & McKay, Cost-Effective, supra note 1, at 264; Pisaniello, Ph.D Thesis, supra
note 27, at xix.
61 Dams Safety Act 1978 (N.S.W.) (Austl.).
62 See Water Act 2000 (Queensl.) (Austl.); Water Act 1989 (Vict.) (Austl.).
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that many smaller dams in catchments pose.63 Tasmania is the only state
to now have an extensive dam safety assurance policy which encompasses
all dams, large and small, private and public, lesser and greater hazard.64
The NSW, Victorian, and Tasmanian policies will be comparatively ana-
lyzed in greater detail later in this paper in order to derive elements of
better practice in private dam safety assurance.
Why does a high level of political ambivalence exist when it comes
to regulating this area? Because dam safety legislation is often considered
too “extreme,” there is concern that it “may place significant cost burdens
upon both government and private owners to administer and conform with
it.”65 However, “[s]tates which fail to establish some form of safety assur-
ance policy on the management of potentially hazardous private dams are,
in effect, unconsciously devaluing the lives of [people] living downstream of
these dams compared with . . . those living downstream of public dams to
which attention has or is being given.”66 This is especially the case in SA.
B. South Australia—A Policy Deficient State67
In SA, many people have, for more than twenty years, expressed
their concern over the need for private dam safety assurance.68 A dam
safety bill similar to the NSW act69 was introduced in parliament in the
mid-1980s, but due to a changing government with different priorities,
the bill lapsed.70 In 1990, a Flood Warning Consultative Committee SA
study found that
there is no means of controlling construction or mainte-
nance of farm dams . . . . [L]ack of power to ensure safety
63 Pisaniello & McKay, Private Dam Safety, supra note 1, at 15.
64 See Water Management Act 1999 (Tas.) (Austl.); Water Management (Safety of Dams)
Regulations 2003 (Tas.) (Austl.).
65 Pisaniello, Zhifang, & McKay, supra note 1, at 87.
66 John D. Pisaniello & Jennifer McKay, The Need for Private Dam Safety Assurance
Policy—A Demonstrative Case Study, AUSTL. J. EMERGENCY MGMT., Spring 1998, at 46,
46 [hereinafter Pisaniello & McKay, A Demonstrative Case Study].
67 Portions of Part I.B are derived from Pisaniello & McKay, Australian Community
Responses, supra note 36; Pisaniello & Burritt, supra note 36.
68 Pisaniello & McKay, A Demonstrative Case Study, supra note 66, at 47.
69 Dams Safety Act 1978 (N.S.W.) (Austl.).
70 See Norm Sheuard, Dam Safety Requirements, in 1993 PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEMINAR
ON FARM DAMS 43, 43 (Hydrological Soc’y of S. Austl. ed., 1993); see also Information
Service, AMPLA BULL. (Australian Mining Petroleum Law Ass’n, Melbourne, Austl.)
1985, at 44, available at http://kirra.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AUMPLawB/1985/16.pdf
(explaining the introduction of the bill into the legislature).
2011] A COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES 525
during and after construction has in the past and will in the
future, inevitably lead to failures and the exacerbation of
flood flows in the river systems. The . . . Committee . . . urges
the Government to introduce legislation and controls . . . for
the construction and maintenance of farm dams.71
During 1992, following extreme and damaging weather throughout the
Mount Lofty Ranges, a number of issues concerning the safety of farm
dams arose.72 A study on the consequences of the floods found that farm
dam failures provided additional problems and contributed to damage
costs.73 In an attempt to address these important and escalating issues,
a seminar was held in April, 1993 by the Hydrological Society of SA.74 It
was suggested as a result of the proceedings that the time had come to
jump-start a Dam Safety Bill.75 However, no further progress was made.76
In 1995, a study of the Kangaroo Creek Dam commissioned by the SA gov-
ernment demonstrated the cumulative safety threats of catchment dams.77
The study urged the government to regulate farm dam construction and
safety.78 However, the government did not respond.79
To test conditions, general maintenance, and spillway capabili-
ties, Pisaniello undertook case studies of hazardous private dams in SA.80
Results provided evidence and greater certainty on the need for dam safety
policy.81 Pisaniello also developed a cost-effective spillway design/review
procedure for the benefit of farmers.82 Widely publicized outputs were
brought to the attention of regulators and farmers.83 Policy response,
71 Pisaniello, Ph.D. Thesis, supra note 27, at 5-6; S. AUSTL. FLOOD WARNING CONSULTATIVE
COMM., FLOOD WARNING MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR SOUTH AUSTRALIA 26–27 (1990).
72 Pisaniello & McKay, Australian Community Responses, supra note 36, at 334.
73 J.F. HARRISON, DISTRICT COUNCIL OF STIRLING, SA, CENTRAL HILLS REGION COUNCILS—
STUDY OF FLOODING ON 30TH AUGUST, 1992 AND 8TH OCTOBER, 1992 1–15 (1992).
74 Pisaniello & McKay, Australian Community Responses, supra note 36, at 334.
75 Sheuard, supra note 70.
76 See Pisaniello & McKay, Australian Community Responses, supra note 36, at 334.
77 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
78 LANGE DAMES CAMPBELL, supra note 34, at 43.
79 See Pisaniello, How to Manage, supra note 27, at 362.
80 See generally Pisaniello, Ph.D. Thesis, supra note 27 (thesis is cumulation of case studies
of hazardous private dams in SA as well as other countries).
81 See Pisaniello & McKay, A Demonstrative Case Study, supra note 66, at 46.
82 See generally John D. Pisaniello, J. R. Argue & Jennifer M. McKay, Flood Capability
Design/Review of Dams on Small Catchments—A Simple and Cost-Effective Regionalised
Procedure, 3 AUSTL. J. OF WATER RES. 177 (1999).
83 See Pisaniello & Burritt, supra note 36, at 16.
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however, was not forthcoming.84 In 2005, Pisaniello and McKay repeated
the spillway flood capability case studies and surveyed farmers on the cost-
effective spillway design/review procedure, and the results show that pro-
viding more time, awareness, and encouragement to farmers addresses
the private dam safety problem to a minimal extent.85 Adequate assur-
ance can only be provided through appropriate policy, which requires the
backing of lawmakers.86
Currently, local councils have only limited control over situating and
constructing dams.87 They are responsible for assessing certain dam appli-
cations for development authorization under SA’s Development Act 1993.88
Natural Resources Management (“NRM”) Boards under SA’s Natural
Resources Management Act 2004 (“NRMA”) have control over farm dams
in respect to storage capacity, mainly for water allocation.89 The NRMA
provides a permit/license process to build or alter dams that may restrict
the capacity or require environmental flow.90 A permit/license under the
NRMA is issued in accordance with only the factors listed in the act, and
the issuing authority is not obligated to consider questions of building or
flood safety.91 In fact, section 135(19) specifically provides that an authority
“is not liable for injury, loss, or damage caused by, or resulting from, the
manner in which an activity [authorized by the permit] is carried out[,] . . .
the design of a dam . . . or the materials used for . . . construction . . . .”92
Therefore, neither act provides the capacity to assess how a dam is de-
signed or built, nor any ongoing supervision to ensure both new and exist-
ing dams are maintained properly.
While SA has been fortunate that no dam has failed with lives lost,93
overseas experience indicates that this is no cause for complacency.94
When it developed the integrated NRMA, the SA government could have
included dam safety assurance measures in its water laws.95 It did not,
84 Id.
85 See generally Pisaniello & McKay, Australian Community Responses, supra note 36.
86 See Pisaniello & Burritt, supra note 36, at 16–17.
87 Id. at 17.
88 Development Act 1993 (S. Austl.) s 24.
89 Natural Resources Management Act 2004 (S. Austl.) s 31.
90 Id. at s 146.
91 Pisaniello & Burritt, supra note 36, at 17.
92 Natural Resources Management Act 2004 (S. Austl.) s 135, para 19.
93 Pisaniello & Burritt, supra note 36, at 4.
94 See Pisaniello & McKay, A Demonstrative Case Study, supra note 66, at 48.
95 John D. Pisaniello, The Need for ‘Adequate’ Farm Dam Safety Management Account-
ability to Avoid Dam Failure Emergencies, AUSTL. J. EMERGENCY MGMT., July 2010, at
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despite research and evidence, and is “not considered critical enough by
policy-makers.”96 It is possible that a policy will be developed only when
an actual disastrous dam failure occurs.97 This reflects the sad reality that
this approach in SA is reactive and not proactive. The potential outcome
could devastate downstream communities that bear the risks. The cur-
rent legislative arrangements are clearly inadequate, given that around
a hundred private dams exist in the Mount Lofty Ranges alone that are
individually of “ANCOLD referable”98 size and potentially hazardous,99
and thousands of smaller dams exist100 which pose considerable cumula-
tive safety threats in catchments.101 The following comparative analysis
provides guidance on more appropriate policy.
II. SUMMARY OF SELECTED INTERSTATE AND OVERSEAS PRIVATE
DAM SAFETY ASSURANCE PRACTICES
This part summarizes the legislative arrangements for dam safety
assurance in Australia (NSW, Victoria, and Tasmania), the United States
(including Michigan and Washington), Canada (including Alberta), the
United Kingdom, South Africa, and Finland, enabling comparative analysis
in Parts III through V.
A. Australia
As indicated above, NSW is the only state to have a specific dam
safety act, Victoria has recently moved to improve its dam safety assurance
31, 32, available at http://www.ema.gov.au/www/emaweb/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/%289A5D88
DBA63D32A661E6369859739356%29~Pisaniello.PDF/$file/Pisaniello.PDF [hereinafter
Pisaniello, Farm Dam Safety].
96 Id. at 32–33.
97 See id. at 33.
98 Id. at 33–34. ANCOLD’s Guidelines on Dam Safety Management considers a dam to be
“referable” (i.e. large enough to pose significant hazard upon failure) when it is higher
than five meters and larger than fifty megaliters in capacity or when it is higher than ten
meters and larger than twenty megaliters. AUSTL. NAT’L COMM. ON LARGE DAMS,
GUIDELINES ON DAM SAFETY MANAGEMENT iii (1994).
99 See Pisaniello, Ph.D Thesis, supra note 27, at 128; 20 PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES 3934–92
(S. Austl. 1985).
100 See DOUG MCMURRAY, DEP’T OF WATER, LAND AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION,
REPORT NO. DWLBC 2004/02, ASSESSMENT OF WATER USE FROM FARM DAMS IN THE
MOUNT LOFTY RANGES SOUTH AUSTRALIA 7 (2003); DOUG MCMURRAY, DEP’T OF WATER,
LAND AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION, REPORT NO. DWLBC 2004/48, FARM DAM VOLUME
ESTIMATIONS FROM SIMPLE GEOMETRIC RELATIONSHIPS 7–8 (2004).
101 LANGE DAMES CAMPBELL, supra note 34, at 2–3; Kazarovski, supra note 55; see also
Part I.A.
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policy, and Tasmania is the only state that has attempted to comprehen-
sively address the problems associated with the multitudes of smaller,
private dams in catchments.102 Lessons can be gained from each of these
jurisdictions; hence, they are reviewed respectively below.
1. New South Wales—An Example of Good Practice103
The Dams Safety Act 1978 (“DSA”) in NSW established the Dam
Safety Committee (“DSC”).104 The DSA provides the DSC with statutory
powers to monitor the state’s private and public prescribed dams and en-
sure they are maintained to an acceptable standard of safety by their
owners.105 Dams are prescribed on the recommendation of the DSC.106 A
dam is normally prescribed if it is more than fifteen meters in height or if
it is a smaller dam posing a considerable hazard to life, property, and/or
environment.107 The hazard classification system adopted by the DSC
comprising high, significant, and low hazard categories, is similar to that
recommended by ANCOLD. In summary: “high hazard”—failure will
endanger many lives in a downstream community and will cause extensive
damage to property and/or environment; “significant hazard”—failure
may endanger some lives and will cause extensive damage to property
and/or environment; “low hazard”—failure poses negligible risk to life
and will cause limited damage.108 The DSC, consisting of nine part-time
members, is independent of any government agencies which construct or
own dams.109 The DSC is funded by the state government and currently
operates on a small annual budget of approximately AU $1 million.110
102 See supra notes 61–64 and accompanying text.
103 Portions of Part II.A.1 are derived from Pisaniello & McKay, Australian Community
Responses, supra note 36; Pisaniello, How to Manage, supra note 27; Pisaniello, Ph.D.
Thesis, supra note 27.
104 Dams Safety Act 1978 (N.S.W.) s 7 (Austl.).
105 See id. at s 14.
106 Id.
107 See N.S.W. DAMS SAFETY COMM., DSC2, ROLE, POLICY AND PROCEDURES 3 (1999).
108 See supra note 22; N.S.W. DAMS SAFETY COMM., DSC13, CONSEQUENCE CATEGORIES
FOR DAMS 9 (2002).
109 Dams Safety Act 1978 (N.S.W.) s 8 (Austl.). Section 8(2) of the DSA requires four DSC
members to be nominated by the four major dam owning authorities of NSW, two by the
Institution of Engineers, Australia, one by the minister administering the Public Works
Act 1912, and a final one by the minister administering the Mining Act 1973. Id. Members
must be experienced in dam engineering. Id.
110 N.S.W. DAMS SAFETY COMM., DAMS SAFETY COMMITTEE ANNUAL REPORT 2006/2007,
at 9 (2007).
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The DSC has the responsibility for setting standards and monitoring their
observance—its standards are based on Australian guidelines developed
in accordance with international practice.111
The DSC is required, under section 14 of the Act, to perform a num-
ber of duties: (a) maintaining “surveillance of prescribed dams;” (b) examin-
ing and investigating their “location, design, construction, modification,
operation, and maintenance;” (c) “obtain[ing] information and keep[ing]
records on matters relating to the safety of dams;” and (d) “formulat[ing]
measures to ensure the safety of dams.”112 The Act, generally, does not in-
clude specific rules or standards but establishes power to make any regu-
lations, consistent with the Act, which the DSC considers are necessary to
control/ensure dam safety.113 A regulation may impose a maximum penalty
of AU $550 if violated.114 Violations of any provision of the Act, or a notice
given by the DSC, attract a maximum penalty of AU $1600.115
The DSC also operates an extensive recording and surveillance
system as follows: (1) all prescribed dam owners are required to have sur-
veillance reports prepared and submitted to the DSC at least once every
five years; (2) requisite type and content of surveillance reporting depends
on dam size and hazard rating, ranging from highly sophisticated reports
prepared by a team of experts for high hazard dams to simple surveillance
sheets completed by the dam owner for significant hazard dams lower than
fifteen meters; (3) the DSC also conducts its own formal periodic inspections
(usually every two years), reviewing information provided in previous sur-
veillance reports.116 The DSC also requires owners of all high and signifi-
cant hazard dams to have emergency action plans (“EAPs”) in place.117
These plans notify all potentially affected persons downstream of the risk
they are living under, and the actions they are to take should dam failure
occur, and for the larger dams, this information must be coordinated with
detailed flood maps and warning sirens through the State Emergency
111 See id. at 11. Also, note the NSW DSC keeps current on international practice through
its contacts with ANCOLD and the International Committee on Large Dams (“ICOLD”).
See id. at 4; International Commission on Large Dams, WORLD WATER COUNCIL, http://
www.worldwatercouncil.org/index.php?id=1511 (last visited Jan. 24, 2011).
112 Dams Safety Act 1978 (N.S.W.) s 14 (Austl.).
113 See id. s 32.
114 See id.; Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (N.S.W.) s 17 (Austl.).
115 See Dams Safety Act 1978 (N.S.W.) s 30, 32 (Austl.); Crimes (Sentencing Procedure)
Act 1999 (N.S.W.) s 17 (Austl.).
116 See N.S.W. DAMS SAFETY COMM., DSC15, REQUIREMENTS FOR SURVEILLANCE REPORTS
1–4, 10–11 (2003).
117 N.S.W. DAMS SAFETY COMM., supra note 110, at 16.
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Service (“SES”).118 The DSC normally aims to function through consult-
ing and cooperating with dam owners, making extensive provision for
owner education, and guidance through many publications, manuals, and
videos on the various aspects of dam safety management.119 The “Dam
Safety Committee Library of Information Sheets”120 are an excellent
example of this.
2. Victoria—An Example of Improving Practice121
As indicated previously, in Victoria around 1000 of the 300,000
private/farm dams are hazardous.122 The Victorian government has, in
recent years, attempted to address farm dam safety by first recognizing
it as a problem and then partnering with the farming and downstream
community to execute the law reform process.123 In early 2000, a Farm
Dams Irrigation Review Committee was established and a discussion
paper titled, “Sustainable Water Resources Management and Farm
Dams,” was later released seeking submissions from the community.124
The paper addressed capacity-sharing issues for off-stream dams and also
recommended that potentially hazardous dams be regulated.125 “From the
responses received, over 70 per cent [sic] were in favor of regulating poten-
tially hazardous dams.”126
The amended Water Act 1989 emerged from these reforms and this
statute deems dam owners responsible and liable for any damage caused
118 See ANCOLD, supra note 98, at 30–31; N.S.W. DAMS SAFETY COMM., DSC12, OPERATION,
MAINTENANCE, AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT REQUIREMENTS FOR DAMS 3–4 (2003).
119 See, e.g., N.S.W. DAMS SAFETY COMM., supra note 110, at 25.
120 See Publications: Guidance Sheets, N.S.W. DAMS SAFETY COMM., http://www.damsafety
.nsw.gov.au/DSC/infosheets.shtm (last updated Dec. 22, 2010).
121 Portions of Part II.A.2 are derived from Pisaniello, Zhifang & McKay, supra note 1;
Pisaniello & McKay, Australian Community Responses, note 36; Pisaniello, Farm Dam
Safety, supra note 95; Pisaniello, How to Manage, supra note 27; Pisaniello & McKay,
Private Dam Safety, supra note 1.
122 See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.
123 See, e.g., Sustainable Water Resources Management and Irrigation Farm Dams: Final
Report Released 24th July 2001, VICTORIAN FARM DAMS (IRRIGATION) REV. (July 2001),
http://web.archive.org/web/20010804121956/http://home.vicnet.net.au/~farmdams/
welcome.htm (accessed by searching for Victorian Farm Dams Review in the Internet
Archive index).
124 Id.
125 See VICT. DEP’T OF SUSTAINABILITY AND ENV’T, STREAM FLOW MANAGEMENT PLANS 3
(2006), available at http://www.melbournewater.com.au/content/library/rivers_and_creeks/
waterway_diverters/stream_flow_management/A_brief_history_of_Stream_Flow
_Management_Planning_in_Victoria.pdf.
126 Pisaniello & McKay, Private Dam Safety, supra note 1, at 16 (citation omitted).
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by their dams and that potentially hazardous dams must be designed, con-
structed, operated, and maintained in line with appropriate standards and
best practices.127 A requirement of the Water Act 1989 is that all dams
must have a license to “take and use” water.128 At the same time, operating
licenses are imposed on potentially hazardous “referable dams,” which in-
cludes those which have a wall height greater than five meters and at least
fifty megaliters storage capacity or those with a wall height greater than
ten meters and at least twenty megaliters capacity.129 The provisions of the
Water Act 1989 sets forth the following safety measures:
• Section 67: Dam licenses can be made subject to var-
ious conditions, including dam safety requirements.
• Section 71: Defines the conditions that can be at-
tached to a license, such as standards of construc-
tion, future operation and maintenance, and the
qualifications of people undertaking these works.
• Section 80: The minister can order dam owners to
make specified improvements or take other mea-
sures to make a dam safe.
• Section 81: Allows the minister to carry out works
and recover costs.130
The Water Act 1989 also requires owners of referable dams to sub-
mit their designs, surveillance plans, and emergency plans, certified by
a qualified engineer, to licensing authorities.131 A qualified engineer re-
views the dam surveillance program during the license renewal process.
Furthermore, the Water Act compels dam owners to supply the emergency-
coordinating agency with a copy of their emergency plans.132
The minister’s powers under the Water Act 1989 are administered
by the Department of Sustainability and Environment.133 “The department
maintains a dams database, which includes most referable and large dams
in the state.”134 Rural Water Authorities have been established in various
127 Water Act 1989 (Vict.) s 80 (Austl.).
128 Id. at s 51.
129 Id. at s 67.
130 Id. at ss 67, 71, 80–81.
131 Id. at s 71.
132 VICT. DEP’T OF SUSTAINABILITY & ENV’T, YOUR DAM, YOUR RESPONSIBILITY: A GUIDE
TO MANAGING THE SAFETY OF FARM DAMS 43 (2007).
133 See Water Act 1989 (Vict.) ss 3, 22 (Austl.).
134 Pisaniello & McKay, Australian Community Responses, supra note 36, at 335.
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regions of the state and are responsible for administering the Act and
licensing requirements.135 Victoria’s Water Act 1989 has penalties for those
owners who fail to comply with its provisions.136 For example, a penalty
of twenty “penalty units” is attached to a breach of section 80.137
Victoria has taken a further significant step in publishing the
booklet Your Dam, Your Responsibility—A Guide to Managing the Safety
of Farm Dams that targets the smaller yet hazardous dams, which are
usually ignored in most jurisdictions, and educates dam owners on their
responsibilities and potential liabilities.138 This particular publication also
educates the owners of non-hazardous dams, advising that even if a dam
does not require an operating license, it is in the farmer’s best interest to
ensure the dam is safe and well maintained; otherwise, the life of the asset
could be severely diminished.139 The booklet uses simple language and
illustrates the necessary processes to keep any farm dam in an acceptable
and safe condition.140 It also contains a template dam safety emergency
plan that is simple to understand and comply with.141
“[T]o [help] address the problem of . . . placing unreasonable cost
burdens upon the farming community, the Victorian Government . . . com-
missioned the University of South Australia to extend the cost-effective
flood safety procedure [to Victoria].”142 The government then assisted the
University of South Australia in testing farmer responses to the cost-
effective engineering procedure.143 The survey demonstrated more effort
is required to raise farmers’ awareness, since many farmers believe that
as their particular dam has not previously failed, it is not likely to do so in
the future.144 Most participants said their dams are safe, but did not spend
money maintaining them.145 Nor did farmers check the situation “despite
the availability of the affordable spillway design/review technology.”146
135 See VICT. DEP’T OF SUSTAINABILITY & ENV’T, supra note 132, at 9.
136 Water Act 1989 (Vict.) s 84 (Austl.).
137 Water Act 1989 (Vict.) s 80. Currently twenty penalty units = AU $2340, as the value
of a penalty unit is approximately $117. JOHN LENDERS, VICT. GOV’T, NO. S 132, NOTICE
UNDER SECTION 6 FIXING THE VALUE OF A FEE UNIT AND A PENALTY UNIT (2009).
138 See generally VICT. DEP’T OF SUSTAINABILITY & ENV’T, supra note 132.
139 See id. at 4.
140 See id. at 1.
141 Id. at 81.
142 Pisaniello & McKay, Australian Community Responses, supra note 36, at 336; see also
Part I.B (describing the cost-effective flood safety procedure).
143 Id.
144 Id. at 338.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 338–39.
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The government also helped to test spillway capabilities of hazardous
private dams in Victoria under the current policy.147 Nearly all the dams
tested have inadequate spillways.148 These surveys and case studies show
efficient and effective administration of dam safety laws is vital.
Such research enables the Victorian government to keep abreast of
law reforms and understand where further policy refinements can be made.
Victoria’s proactive approach contrasts with SA’s reactive strategy.149 The
Victorian government is now undertaking a review of the state’s regulation
of dam safety.150 Issues to be examined by the review include (1) whether
the current regulatory framework delivers adequate public safety, and
(2) how Victoria compares with regulatory models of other state and inter-
national jurisdictions.151
3. Tasmania—An Example of Comprehensive Practice152
The Tasmanian dam safety legislation provides for specific safety
measures to be required for the design, construction, and operation of all
dams that hold one or more megaliter of water or waste, based on their
hazard potential to the community.153
Under the Water Management Act 1999 (“WMA”), all proposed new
dams must obtain a permit,154 and all existing dams have to be registered.155
The WMA is administered by the Department of Primary Industries, Parks,
Water, and Environment (“DPIPWE”),156 and an “Assessment Committee”
constituted under the WMA.157 The main role of the Assessment Committee
147 See Pisaniello & McKay, Private Dam Safety, supra note 1, at 19.
148 See id.
149 See supra Parts I.B, II.A.2.
150 Shane McGrath, Dam Safety Regulation Review—Victoria, 2 AUSTL. NAT’L COMM. ON
LARGE DAMS, April 2009, at 5.
151 Id. at 5.
152 Portions of Part II.A.3 are derived from Pisaniello, How to Manage, supra note 27.
153 Water Management Act 1999 (Tas.) s 165A (Austl.); Water Management (Safety of Dams)
Regulations 2003 (Tas.) ss 3(1), 6(1) (Austl.).
154 Water Management Act 1999 (Tas.) pt 8 (Austl.).
155 Id. at pt. 8A.
156 Water Management (Safety of Dams) Regulations 2003 (Tas.) s 13(3) (Austl.); DPIPWE
was formerly known as the Department of Primary Industries and Water (“DPIW”), and
the DPIPWE combined two departments. See About DPIPWE: Annual Reports, DEP’T.
OF PRIMARY INDUS., PARKS, WATER, & ENV’T, http://www.dpipwe.tas.gov.au/inter.nsf/
Attachments/PWOD-89S4DP/$FILE/DPIPWE_AR_0910_complete.pdf (last visited Jan. 24,
2011).
157 Water Management Act 1999 (Tas.) s 138 (Austl.).
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is to assess all new dam permit applications.158 The minister must appoint
six members to the Committee and these persons are nominated by various
organizations so that collective expertise is available to advise on issues
such as water resources, dams engineering and safety, integrated natural
resource management, and best practice environmental management.159
Furthermore, the permit process legally requires public advertisement
of any new dam proposals before any permit is granted.160 This makes it
possible for DPIPWE to consider any objections to a proposal from the com-
munity.161 The ongoing safety of existing dams is supervised by the min-
ister and the minister’s delegates—primarily officers of DPIPWE.162
All private dam owners have a duty expressly imposed by the WMA
to, “so far as is reasonably practicable, maintain and operate [their] dam[s]
so as not to cause, or be likely to cause, material environmental harm or
serious environmental harm or danger to any person or property.”163 The
minister is granted wide powers in part 8A of the WMA to supervise and
ensure the safety of all registered dams and ensure that dam owners are
not breaching their responsibility.164 In this capacity, the minister has
specific functions under the WMA to:
• Maintain a register of all dams.
• Ensure all dams comply with requisite standards of
design, construction, maintenance, and review as
specified under the regulations.
• Obtain information and keep records on matters
concerning dam safety.165
Dam owners must provide information on their dams either as a con-
dition of a permit under the WMA166 or from a direct order from the min-
ister under various sections relating mainly to ongoing surveillance and
maintenance.167
158 Id. at s 143.
159 Id. at s 139.
160 Dam Work Permits, DEPT. OF PRIMARY INDUS., PARKS, WATER, AND ENV’T, http://www
.dpiw.tas.gov.au/inter.nsf/WebPages/RPIO-4YG57U?open (last visited Jan. 24, 2010).
161 See id. (noting the reasons that notification is required).
162 See Water Management Act 1999 (Tas.) ss 165C, 165D (Austl.).
163 Id. at s 165G.
164 Id. at ss 165C, 165D.
165 Id. at s 165C.
166 Id. at s 157.
167 See, e.g., Water Management Act 1999 (Tas.) ss 165F(2), 165H, 165J, 165M, 165N (Austl.).
2011] A COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES 535
The Water Management (Safety of Dams) Regulations 2003
(“Regulations”), for the most part, provide prescribed standards for the
competency of persons undertaking design, construction, maintenance,
and surveillance of dams, based on their hazard categories.168 Such per-
sons’ levels of competency are classified as “any person,” “the owner”—
persons of either “Class A,” “Class B,” or “Class C,” competence—or an
“expert team.”169 Definitions of these classes of persons in section 6 of the
Regulations include:
• Class A—a professional engineer with “relevant
experience in the investigation, design, construc-
tion and day-to-day safety management of dams of
a height, type and hazard category similar to the
relevant dam.”
• Class B—a professional engineer with “relevant
experience in dam technology appropriate to the
relevant dam.”
• Class C—a professional technical specialist with
“relevant tertiary qualifications; and relevant spe-
cialist experience in the investigation, design, con-
struction or day-to-day safety management of dams
of a height, type and hazard category similar to the
relevant dam.”
• An Expert Team—at least one of the persons has
Class B competence; and the persons collectively
have [a knowledge and understanding of the causes
and modes of dam failure and also have] professional
expertise in [all] areas [that] relate to the relevant
dam and activity.”170
Section 7 of the Regulations provides for varying “required compe-
tency standards” criteria based on the height of the dam, hazard category
of the dam, and the type of activity or reporting to be undertaken or
provided.171 An example of these criteria is provided in Table 1, which is
168 See Water Management (Safety of Dams) Regulations 2003 (Tas.) ss 3, 5 (Austl.).
169 Id. at s 7(2).
170 Id. at s 6.
171 Id. at s 7.
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applicable to dams up to ten meters in height.172 Other similar criteria are
also provided in section 7 of the Regulations for dams between ten meters
and twenty-five meters high and for those greater than twenty-five meters
high.173 The Regulations require that hazard categories be assessed in
accordance with national guidelines published by the ANCOLD:174 these
generally comprise three main categories of high, significant, and low
similar to NSW, but further sub-categories are included and determined
on a more quantitative basis, e.g., very low, high C, high B, high A, and
extreme.175 Similarly, all standards of design and safety management
must comply with ANCOLD guidelines: this includes spillway design stan-
dards,176 the frequency and thoroughness of surveillance, and review and
any requirements for EAPs.177
TABLE 1: REQUIRED COMPETENCY STANDARDS UNDER TASMANIAN




























































172 Id. at s 7(2).
173 Id. at s 7.
174 Water Management (Safety of Dams) Regulations 2003 (Tas.) s 9(1) (Austl.).
175 ANCOLD, CONSEQUENCES OF DAM FAILURE, supra note 22, at 13 tbl.3.
176 AUSTL. NAT’L COMM. ON LARGE DAMS, GUIDELINES ON SELECTION OF ACCEPTABLE
FLOOD CAPACITY FOR DAMS 21 (2000).
177 See generally ANCOLD MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 22.
178 Water Management (Safety of Dams) Regulations 2003 (Tas.) s 7 (Austl.).
179 ANCOLD provides further details on these hazard classifications. See id.; ANCOLD,
CONSEQUENCES OF DAM FAILURE, supra note 22, at 3–9.



















































































Class B Class B Class B Class B Class B
The Tasmanian legislation clearly encompasses all dams, large and
small, low and greater hazard and sets out the level of ongoing safety
surveillance.180 DPIPWE indicates that the owners of significant to high
hazard dams are required to arrange safety inspections and reports by
an experienced dam engineer after the initial filling of the reservoir and
generally every five years during the life of the dam181—for typical higher
hazard irrigation dams in this category, these reports can be expected to
cost around AU $2000.182 In order to avoid placing significant cost burdens
180 See generally Water Management (Safety of Dams) Regulations 2003 (Tas.) (Austl.).
181 See TAS. DEP’T OF PRIMARY INDUS. & WATER, GUIDELINES FOR 5 YEAR DAM SAFETY
SURVEILLANCE REPORTS 3 (2009), available at http://www.stors.tas.gov.au/au-7-0054-00316.
As noted earlier, DPIW is now DPIPWE. See supra note 156.
182 Tas. Dep’t of Primary Indus., Water, & Env’t, Making Dams Safe for Everyone, TAS-
REGIONS: INCORPORATING AGRICULTURE TASMANIA, Feb. 2003, at 16, 16.
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upon owners of smaller, less hazardous dams, these dams do not require
full engineering reports; instead, the owners can prepare these reports
by completing a pro forma document supplied by DPIPWE.183 The hazard
category for such dams can be determined using ANCOLD guidelines,
which provide for quantitative assessment of hazard based on a matrix of
both population at risk (“PAR”) and severity of damage and loss:184 these
parameters can be determined from the “dam failure flood affected zone,”
which can be readily estimated using a simplified procedure for smaller
dams as outlined by ANCOLD.185 DPIPWE makes available a simple on-
line spreadsheet on which this hazard assessment process is displayed.186
DPIPWE has also recognized that a cost-effective spillway design/review
mechanism such as that developed by Pisaniello for SA,187 if developed in
Tasmania, would complement their pro forma process very well.188 “Hence,
[DPIPWE] in June 2008 commissioned the University of South Australia
to undertake a pilot project to develop such technology in Tasmania. The
results will be reported in a future paper.”189
Registering dams does not entail any fee.190 This policy is designed
to encourage the registration of all existing dams; whereas the permit appli-
cation fee covers the registration of new dams when they are granted a per-
mit.191 Fees for permits are set by the Water Management Regulations.192
Current fees are 381 fee units plus:
• 54 fee units for each hour spent in processing the
application (excluding the first 7 hours); and
183 TAS. DEP’T OF PRIMARY INDUS. & WATER, supra note 181, at 3, 11 (showing a copy of this
pro forma document in appendix three).
184 ANCOLD, CONSEQUENCES OF DAM FAILURE, supra note 22, at 3–9.
185 See id.
186 TAS. DEP’T OF PRIMARY INDUS. & WATER, supra note 181, at 5, 10 (showing an example
spreadsheet in appendix two).
187 See, e.g., Pisaniello, Ph.D. Thesis, supra note 27, at 226; Pisaniello, Argue & McKay,
supra note 82.
188 Pisaniello, How to Manage, supra note 27, at 366.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id. See also Dam Work Permits: Applying for a Dam Works Permit, TAS. DEP’T OF
PRIMARY INDUS., PARKS, WATER, & ENV’T, http://www.dpiw.tas.gov.au/inter.nsf/WebPages/
RPIO-4YG57U?open (last updated Sept. 24, 2010) (explaining the process for dam permit
approval); Dam Permit Approval, IRIS TASMANIA, http://www.iris.tas.gov.au/planning_and
_development/other/text_dam_permit (last updated Nov. 9, 2007) (explaining the process
for dam permit approval).
192 Water Management Regulations 2009 (Tas.) sch 3, pt 2 (Austl.).
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• 214 fee units where the application requires a notice
under section 149 of the Act [most dam permits re-
quire advertising so this is the advertising cost]; and
• 421 fee units where the assessment is made by the
Assessment Committee.193
Fee units are currently worth AU $1.36.194 It is important to note
that applications for smaller, straightforward dams can be assessed by the
DPIPWE under delegation from the Assessment Committee.195 This should
work well to minimize costs and fast-track these simpler applications.
Regional Water Management Officers employed by the DPIPWE
make the initial assessment of a dam’s hazard when they do a field in-
spection of the proposed or existing dam site.196 The assessment is then
checked internally by the DPIPWE, and a conservative approach may be
taken or the proponent may be required to have an engineer formally
review the assessment if any doubt remains after the DPIPWE’s internal
assessment.197 A dam’s hazard potential will then determine the DPIPWE’s
mandates as to the frequency of surveillance inspections, reports, safety
reviews, and EAPs in line with ANCOLD guidelines.198
Owners of dams are required by the Regulations to pay a fee to
the Crown for assessing “design, construction, maintenance, surveillance
or decommissioning report[s]” in respect of one or more dams as follows:
115 fee units for the first dam and 77 fee units for each hour or part of an
hour spent in assessing the report.199 This, together with the incremental
fee structure for permits outlined above, provides an innovative and equi-
table user-pays type method for subsidizing the dam-safety assurance
policy in Tasmania.
The WMA provides significant monetary penalties and these attach
to any person who fails to comply with any provisions of the WMA or orders
193 Id.
194 Fee Units Act 1997 and the Value of a Fee Unit, TAS. DEP’T OF TREASURY AND FIN.,
http://www.treasury.tas.gov.au/domino/dtf/dtf.nsf/alls-v/DCA3C64AFF202E06CA2570F
A0083D521 (last visited Jan. 6, 2011).
195 See IRIS TASMANIA, supra note 191 (explaining that applications may be directly ex-
amined by the DPIPWE).
196 Cf. Water Management Regions, TAS. DEPT. OF PRIMARY INDUS., PARKS, WATER & ENV’T,
http://www.dpiw.tas.gov.au/inter.nsf/WebPages/RPIO-4YHANN (last updated Aug. 25,
2010) (explaining the duties of regional water management officers).
197 Pisaniello, How to Manage, supra note 27, at 366–67.
198 See generally ANCOLD MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 22.
199 Water Management (Safety of Dams) Regulations 2003 (Tas.) s 13(1) (Austl.).
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made under the WMA.200 For example, a maximum fine of 100 penalty
units applies to any person failing to provide information to the minister
on the safety of their dam under section 165H,201 and a maximum fine of
200 penalty units and a daily fine not exceeding twenty penalty units (for
each day during which the offence continues) attaches to any person failing
to comply with a maintenance order under section 165L.202 Body corporates
attract fines 2.5 times these levels.203 Penalty units are currently worth
AU $130.204
The DPIPWE also provides for substantial owner education and
guidance through the publication of website information and articles in
departmental and other publications.205
The DPIPWE reported that “implementation of dam safety legis-
lation and regulations following amendment to the Act in 2002 now en-
sures that best practice safety procedures are followed in the construction,
maintenance and surveillance of dams [in Tasmania].”206 As of 2005, there
were 5674 registered dams in Tasmania.207 Currently there are around
8000.208 “This increase is [due to] the new dams (around 200 per year) that
have been built since 2005[,] as well as many existing dams having been
identified and registered for the first time—evidence that the policy is being
effectively administered.”209 Approximately 500 of the registered dams are
200 Water Management Act 1999 (Tas.) s 165 (Austl.).
201 Id. at s 165H.
202 Id. at s 165L.
203 Id.
204 Value of Indexed Amounts in Legislation, TAS. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.tas
.gov.au/legislationreview/value_of_indexed_units_in_legislation (last visited Jan. 24, 2011).
205 See, e.g., TAS. DEP’T OF PRIMARY INDUS. & WATER, DAM WORKS CODE 2007 (2007),
available at http://www.dpiw.tas.gov.au/inter.nsf/Attachments/JMUY-79F933/$FILE/Dam
%20Works%20Code%202007.pdf; TAS. DEP’T OF PRIMARY INDUS. & WATER, GUIDELINES FOR
THE CONSTRUCTION OF EARTH-FILL DAMS (2008), available at http://www.dpiw.tas.gov.au/
inter.nsf/Attachments/JMUY-7L38XP/$FILE/Guidelines%20for%20earth-fill%20dams
.pdf; IRIS TASMANIA, supra note 191; TAS. DEP’T OF PRIMARY INDUS., PARKS, WATER, &
ENV’T, supra note 191; TAS. DEP’T OF PRIMARY INDUS. & WATER, supra note 181; Tas. Dep’t
of Primary Indus., Parks, Water, & Env’t, supra note 182.
206 WATER RES. DIV., TAS. DEP’T OF PRIMARY INDUS., WATER & ENV’T, REPORT ON THE




208 State of the Environment Tasmania 2009: Water Extraction and Storage, TASMANIAN
PLANNING COMM’N, http://soer.justice.tas.gov.au/2009/wat/3/issue/91/ataglance.php (last
updated Mar. 1, 2010); Interview with S. Ditchfield, Dams Safety Engineer, Tas. Dep’t of
Primary Indus. & Water, in Tasmania (Mar. 2009).
209 Interview with S. Ditchfield, supra note 208.
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of either significant hazard or higher, i.e., being sufficiently dangerous to
require extensive ongoing statutory safety surveillance and reporting.210
All of these dams have been placed on a “prescribed dams” register within
the DPIPWE dam database.211 Approximately 350 (two-thirds) of the pre-
scribed dams are privately owned.212
Taking considerable time, effort, and resources, DPIPWE identifies
all existing dams in Tasmania that should be included on the register to
ensure they comply.213 DPIPWE has limited resources for this task, so sig-
nificant and high hazard dams have priority in terms of strict enforcement
of standards.214 Even low hazard dams are targeted when potential cascade
or cumulative failure scenarios arise,215 and such scenarios are common.216
DPIPWE carefully considers each scenario and adjusts smaller dams’
hazard ratings when appropriate, thus imposing stronger surveillance,
reporting, and safety standards.217 DPIPWE indicated many low hazard
dams will be found using field surveillance officers, satellite imagery, and
other mapping techniques.218 The five-yearly surveillance reports man-
dated by regulation will be strictly imposed.219 Inevitably, as dams through-
out Tasmania are discovered and come onto the register, the cumulative
threats posed by small dams in large catchments will decline.
B. United States220
In the United States, fears about dam safety were fueled when two
tragic failures were experienced in 1972: Canyon Lake’s failure caused up
to 237 lives to be lost,221 and Buffalo Creek’s failure caused 125 lives to be
lost.222 In the wake of these disasters, dam safety became a major target for
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Interview with S. Ditchfield, Dams Safety Engineer, Tas. Dep’t of Primary Indus. &






218 Interview with S. Ditchfield, supra note 212.
219 Id.
220 Portions of Part II.B are derived from Pisaniello, Ph.D. Thesis, supra note 27.
221 Dam Failures and Incidents, ASS’N OF STATE DAM SAFETY OFFICIALS, http://www
.damsafety.org/news/?p=412f29c8-3fd8-4529-b5c9-8d47364c1f3e (last visited Jan. 24, 2011).
222 Id.
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investigation.223 As a result, significant federal initiatives on dam safety
have been provided to the states: (1) the National Dam Inspection Program,
conducted under federal legislation beginning in 1972, showed the extent
of the public and private dam safety problem,224 and (2) extensive work
performed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) has
provided encouragement and guidelines to the states to establish effective
dam safety programs.225 This work by FEMA is discussed in greater detail
in Part IV.B below.
1. Summary of State Legislation
In response to the federal initiative, all fifty states, with the excep-
tion of Alabama, have established dam safety control programs, most of
which are being implemented effectively.226 The approaches used to control
dam safety vary; however, the key components of the FEMA guidelines
are consistent among most state programs.227 For example, requirements
of EAPs for high and significant hazard dams, and their associated mini-
mum criteria, are consistent among the majority of practices.228 Slight
variations between states may be evident in aspects such as size criteria
used for identifying applicable dams, methods of enforcing rules and regu-
lations, and frequency and thoroughness of inspections.229 Michigan is an
example of good practice, while Washington is an example of alternative
practice, both warranting further discussion.230
2. Michigan: An Example of Good Practice
Following an inventory in the late 1980s finding around 330 haz-
ardous privately owned dams,231 Michigan enacted the Dam Safety Act
223 See WATER & POWER RES. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, SAFETY EVALUATION OF
EXISTING DAMS 2 (1980).
224 See National Dam Inspection Program of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-367, 86 Stat. 507 (codified
at 33 U.S.C. § 467); WATER AND POWER RES. SERV., supra note 223, at 1–4.
225 See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, NO. 316, MODEL STATE DAM SAFETY PROGRAM
iii (1998).
226 FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, NO. P-759, DAM SAFETY IN THE UNITED STATES 11
(2009).
227 See id.
228 See id. at 12, 15, 18.
229 See id. at 11, 18.
230 See discussion infra Parts II.B.2, II.C.3.
231 FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, 1991 SUPPLEMENT TO THE 1989 REPORT ON REVIEW
OF STATE NON-FEDERAL DAM SAFETY PROGRAMS 174 (1992); ASS’N OF STATE DAM SAFETY
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of 1989.232 In 1995, this act was recodified into part 315 of the Natural
Resources and Environmental Protection Act of 1994,233 and will be re-
ferred to in this part as “the Act.” The Act has two main purposes: to regu-
late the construction, repair, alteration, abandonment, and operation of
dams; and to provide for their regular inspection.234 The applicable dams
are those higher than six feet (1.8 meters), and the dams are registered
through a permit (user-pays) system.235 The Michigan Department of
Natural Resources (“MDNR”) is responsible for administering the Act.236
Michigan strictly defines, under statute, most of the standard re-
quirements relating to dams and their safety.237 Such standards include
criteria on assigning hazard ratings (based on a high, significant, and low
hazard rating system similar to NSW), frequency and thoroughness of
inspections, minimum spillway capacities, and EAPs.238 The Act also con-
tains strict surveillance and inspection provisions: in general, owners must
submit to the MDNR inspection reports prepared by licensed professional
engineers, at minimum frequencies of once every three, four, and five years
for high, significant, and low hazard dams, respectively.239 If surveillance
identifies a dam to be deficient, the MDNR can order the owner to under-
take and pay for whatever actions it considers are necessary to eliminate
the deficiency.240
Under section 324.31523 of the Act, a provision for emergency pre-
paredness procedures requires owners of all high and significant hazard
dams to prepare action plans containing, at minimum, the following in-
formation: (a) “the name, address, and telephone number of the person,
and . . . an alternate person, responsible for operation of the dam; [(b)] the
name and telephone number of local emergency management coordinators;
and [(c)] a listing of occupied facilities, buildings, and residences that may
OFFICIALS, MICHIGAN DAM SAFETY LAWS AND REGULATIONS (2007), available at http://www
.damsafety.org/media/Documents/STATE_INFO/LAWS_&_REGS/Michigan_L&R.pdf.
232 MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 281.1301-281.1365 (repealed 1994); ASS’N OF STATE DAM SAFETY
OFFICIALS, supra note 231.
233 Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act of 1994 pt. 315, 1994 Mich. Pub.
Acts 451 (codified as amended MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 324.31501-324.31529 (2010)); ASS’N
OF STATE DAM SAFETY OFFICIALS, supra note 231.
234 See id. at §§ 324.31507, 324.31509, 324.31518.
235 Id. at §§ 324.31502, 324.31509.
236 Id. at § 324.31506.
237 See generally id. at §§ 324.31501-324.31529.
238 Id. at § 324.31516.
239 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.31518 (2010).
240 Id.
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be threatened with flooding due to failure of the dam.”241 The Act specifies
that civil action may be taken against any dam owner or other person that
is in violation of any of the terms of the Act, or any rule, order, or permit
issued pursuant to the Act, and a finding of guilt in court is subject to a
maximum civil fine of “$10,000.00 for each day of violation.”242 The MDNR
is also authorized to establish, by rule, administrative monetary penalties
for minor violations of the Act.243 The MDNR has also provided for owner
education and guidance through periodic seminars and production of many
useful owner guideline publications.244 This educative approach promotes
dam safety by informing dam owners of the possible liabilities of dam own-
ership and guiding them to meet their responsibility to safely operate,
maintain, and repair their dams.245
3. Washington: An Example of Alternative Practice
Washington is another state which displays sound and highly pre-
scriptive dam safety assurance policy. The policy is based on dam safety
statutes contained in chapters 90.03, 43.21A, and 86.16 of the Revised
Code of Washington (“RCW”), and dam safety rules contained in chapters
173–75 of the Washington Administrative Code.246 The statutes provide
the Department of Ecology’s (“DoE”) Dam Safety Office with wide powers
to regulate and control the safety of dams.247 The dams subject to regula-
tion are all those with a maximum storage volume of ten or more acre-feet
(twelve megaliters).248 As of July 2003, 940 Washington dams were regu-
lated by the Dam Safety Office.249 About 330 of the 940 dams are located
241 Id. at § 324.31523.
242 Id. at §§ 324.31524–324.31525.
243 Id. at § 324.31525.
244 For the full range of current dam owner guideline publications, see MICH. DEP’T OF
NATURAL RES. & ENV’T, http://www.mi.gov/damsafety (last visited Jan. 25, 2011). In
particular, see Michigan Dam Owners Workshop, MICH. DEP’T OF NATURAL RES. & ENV’T,
http://www.michigan.gov/deq/0,1607,7-135-3308_3333_4168-215641--,00.html (last visited
Jan. 25, 2011) (displaying the recording of a recent seminar).
245 Id. Also see MICH. DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., MICHIGAN DAM SAFETY GUIDEBOOK (1991),
which still represents a useful, practical reference for private dam owners.
246 WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, DOC. NO. 92-55A, DAM SAFETY GUIDELINES PART I: GENERAL
INFORMATION AND OWNER RESPONSIBILITIES 5–6 (2004), available at http://www.ecy.wa
.gov/pubs/9255a.pdf.
247 Id. at 5–6.
248 Id. at 5.
249 Id. at 3.
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above populated areas and are therefore classified as having high or sig-
nificant downstream hazards, and, of these, 140 are small dams less than
fifteen feet (4.6 meters) in height.250 A three-level hazard rating system,
comprised of low, significant, and high hazard categories, was adopted
based on criteria similar to that of NSW and Michigan.251
The main duties of the DoE, as specified under the statutes, include:
• determination of reservoir capacity;
• conducting periodic inspections and reviews;
• record keeping and reporting;
• approving the construction of new dams and the
subsequent issuing of permits; and
• the promulgation of necessary rules.252
As indicated above, the DoE’s Dam Safety Office is responsible for
implementing appropriate inspection and review programs for all dams.253
An appropriate fee is charged to the dam owner for this service.254 This
responsibility is also extended to checking and supervising the design and
construction of new dams.255 Such directed surveillance is in contrast to
typical dam safety assurance policies, which usually place this responsi-
bility upon the dam owner, who is required to consult a professional engi-
neer (as in NSW, Tasmania, and Michigan).256 The DoE performs periodic
inspections and reviews of existing dams at least every five years for high
hazard dams, at least every ten years for significant hazard dams, and as
considered necessary for low hazard dams.257 “Owners are [also] required
to conduct annual surficial inspections and submit a copy of the inspection
checklist to the department within 30 days following the inspection.”258
250 Id. at 4.
251 See WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, DOC. NO. 92-55B, DAM SAFETY GUIDELINES PART II:
PROJECT PLANNING AND APPROVAL OF DAM CONSTRUCTION OR MODIFICATION 14 (2008),
available at http://www.ecy.wa.gov/pubs/9255b.pdf.
252 WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, supra note 246, at 6–8.
253 Id.
254 See id. at 52–54.
255 See id. at 6–7.
256 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.31508; N.S.W. DAM SAFETY COMM., DSC3G, GENERAL
DAM SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS 5–6 (2010); Dam Safety, TAS. DEP’T OF PRIMARY INDUS.,
PARKS, WATER, & ENV’T, http://www.dpiw.tas.gov.au/inter.nsf/WebPages/JMUY-7N22DQ
?open (last updated Nov. 29, 2010).
257 WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, supra note 246, at 7.
258 Id. at 10 (emphasis omitted). Information to assist owners in performing these inspec-
tions can be found in chapter 5 of WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, DOC. NO. 92-55C, DAM SAFETY
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The DoE has published guidelines which consist of four basic
parts: (1) general information and procedures,259 (2) project planning and
approval,260 (3) an owner’s guidance manual,261 and (4) dam design and
construction.262 The guidelines “are intended to provide dam owners, oper-
ators, and design engineers with information on . . . procedures[ ] and
[statutory] requirements . . . .”263 The DoE requires EAPs of varying
levels for all high and significant hazard dams.264 Typically, the EAP
should include the following information:
• Notification procedures . . . and responsibilities for
notifying downstream residents in the event of an
impending dam failure.
• A notification list that includes the names and tele-
phone numbers of all affected downstream residents,
dam owner and operator, local emergency officials,
and appropriate government agencies (including the
Dam Safety Office).
• Specific instructions to be followed by responsible
parties at the dam site in response to emergencies
such as floods, equipment failures, or other unusual
events where the situation might lead to dam fail-
ure and immediate remedial action can be effective
to prevent failure or reduce hazards to downstream
residents.265
The statutes assign power to the DoE to levy civil penalties for
the violation of either statutory provisions, rules, permits, or regulatory
orders.266 Penalties as modest as $100 per day of violation to as much as
$5000 per day of violation can result.267 However, the laws and rules do
GUIDELINES PART III: AN OWNER’S GUIDANCE MANUAL 21–29 (1992), available at http://
www.ecy.wa.gov/pubs/9255c.pdf.
259 WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, supra note 246.
260 WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, supra note 251.
261 WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, supra note 258.
262 WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, DOC. NO. 92-55D, DAM SAFETY GUIDELINES PART IV: DAM
DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION (1993), available at http://www.ecy.wa.gov/pubs/9255d.pdf.
263 WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, supra note 246, at 1.
264 See id. at 46.
265 Id. at 11.
266 See id. at 48.
267 Id. at 48–49.
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not specifically address owner or departmental liabilities.268 This is a
critical issue discussed further in Part IV.B below.
C. Canada269
Canada has no federal initiative to encourage dam safety; respon-
sibility for assuring dam safety rests entirely with the provinces.270
1. Outline of Province Legislation
Of the ten provinces and two territories, only Alberta, British
Columbia, and Quebec have specific dam safety legislation.271 With one
exception, the remaining provinces and territories acknowledge the need
for dam safety and address this concern through less extensive de-facto
dam safety programs under their current water legislation.272 In 1978,
Alberta became the first province in Canada to enact specific dam safety
legislation.273 “This legislation is unique in that it was not brought about
by any major dam failure in Alberta or the rest of Canada, but indirectly by
a series of failures in the United States, notably Teton and Taccoa Falls.”274
A brief overview of the Alberta practice, which is representative of good
practice in Canada, follows.
2. Alberta: An Example of Good Practice
The Dam & Canal Safety Regulations of 1978 (amended in 1998)
provide the Minister of Environment with wide powers, many of which are
delegated to the Dam Safety and Water Projects Branch (“DSB”) Head, to
control the safety of all licensed275 dams which are over 2.5 meters high
or larger than 30 megaliters.276 The DSB uses a three-level hazard rating
268 See WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, supra note 246, at 5–6 (showing a lack of discussion
concerning owner or departmental liabilities).
269 Portions of Part II.C are derived from Pisaniello, Ph.D. Thesis, supra note 27.
270 See Grant F. Smith, The Status of Dam Safety Legislation in Canada, CAN. DAM ASS’N
BULL., Spring 2003, at 10, 15.
271 See id. at 11, 16 tbl.1.
272 See id. at 15, 16 tbl.1.
273 ALBERTA DEP’T OF ENV’T, PUB. NO. T/444, WATER ACT, DAM AND CANAL SAFETY
GUIDELINES 1 (1991).
274 Pisaniello, Ph.D Thesis, supra note 27, at 66.
275 Registration is via a user-pays licensing system. See ALBERTA DEP’T OF ENV’T, supra
note 273, at 1–2.
276 Water Act, Water (Ministerial) Regulation, A. Reg. 205/98 c. 1 (Can.).
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system and obligates dam owners to monitor (via professional engineer)
and maintain their dams, and provide for Emergency Preparedness Plans
in a similar fashion to NSW, with surveillance/reporting frequency being
five-yearly.277 Formal dam safety inspections by the DSB are also conducted
periodically.278 If surveillance reveals inadequacy, the DSB Head has power
to direct the dam owner to undertake remedial action.279 Persons failing
to comply with any statutory provisions are guilty of a criminal offense,
which can lead to suspension or cancellation of license.280 The DSB has
also published extensive guidelines for dam owners.281
D. United Kingdom282
In 1925, two significant dam failures triggered the need for the
Reservoirs (Safety Provisions) Act (“1930 Act”) which was subsequently
enacted in 1930.283 The 1930 Act applied to all reservoirs larger than 22.7
megaliters, made owners entirely responsible for maintaining their reser-
voirs, required all reservoirs to undergo statutory inspection by a qualified
“statutory panel” engineer at least once every ten years, and be issued with
a safety certificate following panel approval.284 In 1966, the Institution
of Civil Engineers reported a need for better administration of the 1930
Act.285 Hence, in 1975, a revised bill of the 1930 Act was proposed, which
provided more explicit powers to enforcement authorities and stepped up
dam surveillance.286 However, the new act was not passed due to nega-
tive political response.287 In 1983, renewed pressure to implement the
Reservoirs Act 1975 (“1975 Act”) emerged when a Select Committee study
revealed a disturbing picture of the number of dams still escaping inspec-
tion under the 1930 Act: of the 1500 applicable dams, at least 190 were
found with no recorded owner and 93 had no safety certificates.288
277 See ALBERTA DEP’T. OF ENV’T, supra note 273, at 4, 11.
278 Id. at 5.
279 See id. at 5–6.
280 See Water Act, Water (Ministerial) Regulations, A. Reg. 193/98 c. 2 (Can.).
281 ALBERTA DEP’T OF ENV’T, supra note 273, at 1.
282 Portions of Part II.D are derived from Pisaniello, Ph.D. Thesis, supra note 27.
283 A. I. B. Moffat, British Reservoir Legislation and the Reservoirs Act, 1975, in THE
EVALUATION OF DAM SAFETY: ENGINEERING FOUNDATION CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS
39, 40–41 (1976).
284 Id. at 41.
285 See id. at 42.
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In 1986, the 1975 Act was enacted and has since remained in
force.289 The role of an Enforcement Authority under the 1975 Act is essen-
tially a compliance audit role.290 Under this act, responsibility for enforce-
ment was for many years delegated to local county councils with their
obligations and powers being clearly defined.291 However, in the late 1990s,
an inconsistent application of the 1975 Act by local authorities in England
and Wales was identified by Sims and Parr.292 This led England and
Wales to transfer the responsibility for enforcement of the 1975 Act to the
Environment Agency on October 1, 2004, through the Water Act 2003.293
The 1975 Act applies to all dams larger than twenty-five megaliters
and requires local authorities to keep registers of all such dams.294 The
1975 Act provides for regular surveillance of dams in addition to the ten-
yearly statutory inspections of the 1930 legislation.295 To perform these
inspection and surveillance procedures, the 1975 Act establishes “panel
engineers”296 and “supervising engineers.”297 The 1975 Act requires panel
engineers to be independent of the owners and designers of the dams in
their charge.298 The function of panel engineers is twofold: they can either
conduct statutory inspections or supervise the design, construction, or
alteration of dams.299 Individual panel engineers cannot be commissioned
to perform both functions for the same project.300 The supervising engineer
is a qualified engineer employed by the dam owner to continually monitor
the condition of a dam during its life (between statutory inspections).301 A
289 Pisaniello, Ph.D Thesis, supra note 27, at 71.
290 See Reservoir Safety, THE BRITISH DAM SOC’Y, http://www.britishdams.org/reservoir
_safety (last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
291 See Charnock, supra note 286, at 19.
292 See G. P. Sims & N. M. Parr, The Review of the Reservoirs Act 1975, in THE PROSPECT
FOR RESERVOIRS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 66, 67–68 (Paul Tedd ed., 1998).
293 THE SCOTTISH GOV’T, THE FUTURE OF FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT IN SCOTLAND 66 (2008).
294 HEALTH & SAFETY EXEC., OC 847/10, RESERVOIRS AND HSW ACT: INSPECTION POLICY
1–2 (2003), available at http://www.hse.gov.uk/foi/internalops/fod/oc/800-899/847_10.pdf.
295 Sandelands, Noble & Findlay, Risk Assessment of Individual Dams, in THE PROSPECT
FOR RESERVOIRS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 25 (Paul Tedd ed., 1998).
296 See Reservoirs Act, 1975, c. 23 § 4 (U.K.). The “panel” is a body of specialist engineers
appointed by the secretary of state on the basis of their having sufficient supervisory ex-
perience in the design and construction of dams. Id. Panel status applies for a maximum
five-year term. Id.
297 Id. at § 12.
298 See, e.g., id. at §§ 4, 10.
299 See FLOOD EMERGENCIES PROGRAMME, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS FOR RESERVOIR
OWNERS IN ENGLAND AND WALES—VERSION 2, at 11 (2009), available at http://www.defra
.gov.uk/environment/flooding/documents/reservoir/seminar-faq.pdf.
300 See id. at 11–12.
301 See id. at 12.
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statutory inspection may be recommended to an owner by the supervising
engineer at any time considered necessary.302 Owners have a strict statu-
tory obligation to supply information to the panel.303 If an inspection report
includes any recommendation on measures to be taken in the interest of
safety, the 1975 Act obligates owners to promptly carry out the recommen-
dations.304 Section 22 attaches criminal liability to any owner who fails
to comply with the provisions of the 1975 Act, and maximum fines range
from £250 to £800.305 No provision for emergency plans is evident under
legislation, as the general approach to dam safety in the United Kingdom
has been based on the concept of hazard prevention rather than hazard pre-
paredness.306 However, in recent years, the Institution of Civil Engineers
have given this a renewed focus and impetus in the United Kingdom in line
with worldwide practice.307 This led to the Water Act 2003 establishing
a need for reservoir flood plans.308 Much work towards developing guides
for such plans has occurred in recent years.309 This should eventually en-
courage owners of hazardous dams to establish plans comprising three
components: impact assessment, on-site plan, and off-site response.310
E. South Africa311
In 1984, in light of worldwide experience, South Africa passed the
Water Amendment Act 1984,312 and later specific Regulations (1986), to be
administered by the Dam Safety Office (“DSO”).313 This act provides the
302 Reservoirs Act, 1975, c. 23 § 12(3) (U.K.).
303 See id. at § 12.
304 See id. at § 10.
305 Id. at § 22 (depending on which provision is breached).
306 See SHANE MCGRATH, PROJECT: TO STUDY INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE AND USE OF RISK
ASSESSMENT IN DAM MANAGEMENT 12 (2000), available at http://www.churchilltrust.com
.au/site_media/fellows/McGrath_Shane_2000.PDF.
307 See ICE: Flooding and Emergency Planning Seminar, INST. OF CIVIL ENG’R, http://
www.floodrisknet.org.uk/events/Event.2003-03-10.5112/view (last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
308 See Tim Ambler, Reservoir Flood Plans: Impact Assessment (17 December 2009), ADAM
SMITH INST. (Apr. 1, 2010, 06:00), http://www.adamsmith.org/blog/regulation-and-industry/
reservoir-flood-plans%3A-impact-assessment-(17-december-2009)/#.
309 See, e.g., Make a Flood Plan, ENV’T AGENCY, http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk/
homeandleisure/floods/38329.aspx (last updated Jan. 19, 2011).
310 See INST. OF CIVIL ENG’R, supra note 307.
311 Portions of Part II.E are derived from Pisaniello, Ph.D. Thesis, supra note 27.
312 Water Amendment Act 96 of 1984 (S. Afr.) (repealed 1998, current legislation National
Water Act 36 of 1998 (S. Afr.)).
313 About Dam Safety Office, DAM SAFETY OFFICE, S. AFR. DEP’T WATER AFFAIRS, http://
www.dwa.gov.za/DSO/About.aspx (last visited Jan. 25, 2011) (established to implement
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DSO with wide powers to control the safety of dams higher than five meters
and larger than fifty megaliters.314 Under section 15 of the Regulations
(1986), the DSO is responsible for maintaining a register of applicable
dams, classified according to size and hazard potential based on criteria
similar to NSW.315
The Regulations (1986) specify strict rules relating to the construc-
tion or alteration of dams, and these rules include requiring that designs
be produced by an approved professional engineer and requiring permits
to be issued at various stages of works.316 Dam owners must provide safety
inspection reports at intervals not longer than five years, and the required
level of inspection and associated reporting varies for dams of different size
and hazard rating, similar to NSW.317 By rule, the DSO requires the owners
of all high or significant hazard dams to provide EAPs for their dams—to
varying levels depending on hazard—similar to Michigan and Alberta.318
Section 11.8 of the Regulations (1986) also requires each owner keep up-to-
date records of all materials relating to their dam’s safety in a safe place
where it can be consulted conveniently by all parties concerned, especially
in emergency cases.319 The Regulations (1986) attach criminal liability for
any non-compliance with a maximum fine of R10,000, plus R50 a day until
there is compliance, or a maximum of six months imprisonment.320
F. Finland
Dam safety legislation in Finland, first proclaimed in 1984, consists
of the Dam Safety Act (“DS Act”) and Dam Safety Decree (“DSD”).321 The
DS Act outlines principle dam safety provisions while the DSD consists
and administer the Dam Safety Regulations published in 1986 and still in force under the
National Water Act 36 of 1998).
314 S. AFR. DAM SAFETY OFFICE, REF. NO. 12/16/2, SUMMARY OF LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR
PROSPECTIVE AND EXISTING DAM OWNERS 1 (2004), available at http://www.dwa.gov.za/
DSO/Guidelines.aspx.
315 Dam Safety Regulations, Government Notice (GN) R.1560/1986 § 15 (S.Afr.), available
at http://www.dwa.gov.za/DSO/Documents/notice156025Jul86.pdf.
316 See id. at § 6.
317 See id. at § 12.1.
318 See DAM SAFETY OFFICE, S. AFR. DEP’T OF WATER AFFAIRS, 2009–2010 ANNUAL REPORT
19 (2010). Appendix A discusses the goal for all South African dams to possess an EAP and
briefly notes the difference between the requirements for dams in different categories. Id.
319 See Dam Safety Regulations, Government Notice (GN) R. 1560/1986 §§ 11.8-11.10 (S.Afr.).
320 Id. at §§ 19.1.3, 19.2.
321 FIN. MINISTRY OF AGRIC. & FORESTRY, DAM SAFETY CODE OF PRACTICE 5, 7 (1997),
available at http://www.ymparisto.fi/download.asp?contentid=17581&lan=EN.
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of more detailed regulations relating to the DS Act’s execution.322 The
National Board of Waters (“NBW”) is responsible for administering the
DS Act.323 The DS Act applies to all dams higher than three meters and
any lower dams which, upon failure, pose an apparent hazard to human
life, health, property, or environment.324 The general responsibilities and
obligations of dam owners under the legislation are similar to those under
Alberta practice in relation to maintenance, surveillance and reporting,
and emergency preparedness procedures.325 The NBW is responsible for
approving all surveillance programs together with ensuring and supervis-
ing their implementation.326 Dam owners must keep all material relating
to their dam’s safety in a special safety file.327 The file must be stored at a
place where, if an accident threatens, is easily assessable to those con-
cerned.328 The DS Act attaches severe criminal liability and penalties for
any non-compliance.329
III. BENCHMARKING DAM SAFETY ASSURANCE POLICY330
The analysis of the international context above demonstrates that
schemes to manage dam safety vary between and within countries. How-
ever, key components in certain practices can be identified, including:
common law, federal involvement, legislation, command and control regu-
lation, administration, registration and classification of dams, surveillance,
322 See Patoturvallisuuslaki (kumottu) [Dam Safety Act] 1.6 1984/413 (Fin.);
Patoturvallisuusasetuksen [Dam Safety Decree] 27.7.1984/574 (Fin.) (amended by
Patoturvallisuusasetuksen [Dam Safety Regulation] 91/1995); FIN. MINISTRY OF AGRIC.
& FORESTRY, supra note 321 at 78–81.
323 See FIN. MINISTRY OF AGRIC. & FORESTRY, supra note 321, at 6, 7. Administration of
the DSA was later under the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture and
Forestry. See Patoturvallisuuslaki [Dam Safety Act] 1.6 1984/413 § 7 (amended by Laki
patoturvallisuuslain muuttamisesta [Dam Safety Act amendment] 90/1995 § 7).
324 Dam Safety Act 1.6 1984/413 § 3.
325 See supra Part II.C.2.
326 See Dam Safety Act 1.6 1984/413 §§ 6, 7 (amended by Dam Safety Act Amendment
90/1995 § 7) (safety observation program or approval of changes now decided by the
Regional Environment Center; the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Ministry may
issue further guidance on the monitoring program).
327 See id. at § 5.
328 See id.
329 See id. at §§ 12, 13 (amended by Laki patoturvallisuuslain 12 ja 13 § :n muuttamisesta
[Dam Safety Act Amendments, §§ 12, 13] 596/1995). Penalties vary and are dependent on
which provision is breached. For example, non-compliance under section 4 of the DS Act—
to maintain the dam in a safe condition—shall be punished by fines or imprisonment up to
a period of two years. See id. at § 11 (amended by Dam Safety Act Amendment 90/1995 § 11).
330 Portions of Part III are derived from Pisaniello & Burritt, supra note 36.
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accounting and reporting, codes and/or standards of conduct, community
education and preparedness, punitive enforcement, and owner education
and guidance.
For example, in many countries, including Australia, owner respon-
sibility exists under common law to manage and maintain dams accord-
ing to current standards.331 In Australia, these standards are set by
ANCOLD.332 Hence, owners should manage and review their dams, and
take appropriate action where necessary, in order to minimize the risk
of failure and avoid liability for possible consequences of failure. How-
ever, many jurisdictions in Australia and overseas have found that it is
not enough to rely solely on common law responsibility to protect down-
stream communities, property, and the environment from poor dam safety
management practices.333 Some form of statutory dam safety management
accountability and assurance policy is required where privately owned
dams exist in order to achieve sustainable and safe catchments. ANCOLD
states that:
A role of government is to enact legislation to protect the
community. Legislation should establish regulatory author-
ities that ensure dam owners, and potential dam owners,
are taking appropriate actions in regard to dam safety.334
A contrasting mechanism is for government to use an information
strategy that informs and educates stakeholders of potential risks and
liabilities.335 Overall, three main independent methods for providing in-
creased dam safety assurance to the public can be identified from the set
of possibilities:
• Owner education, encouragement, and guidance—
providing guidelines and information publications
to dam owners in the hope that they act responsibly
and in line with common law.336
• Community preparedness through EAPs—requiring
the owners of all potentially hazardous dams to have
331 McKay & Pisaniello, supra note 28, at 27; Wensley, supra note 28, at 23, 30.
332 See supra note 22.
333 See supra notes 9–16 and accompanying text.
334 ANCOLD MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 22, at 3; Pisaniello & Burritt, supra
note 36, at 6.
335 See NEIL GIBSON, PETER GRABOSKY & DARREN SINCLAIR, SMART REGULATION: DESIGNING
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 60–61 (1998).
336 See id.
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EAPs in place by law. This also requires the govern-
ment to establish and maintain a dams register to
enable mandating of EAPs of increasing sophisti-
cation for increasing hazard potential, while also en-
abling the general status of dam safety management
to be kept in check. Such law satisfies the “commu-
nity right to know” principle as downstream com-
munities are made aware of the risks and hazards
they are living under and provided with the oppor-
tunity for escape in the event of dam failure.337
• Command and control—strict regulation and super-
vision by means of dam safety legislation—setting
specific rules, standards, codes, and regulations on
dam safety management which dam owners must
legally follow, and providing for supervision to
ensure compliance.338
The first method potentially places the public at greatest risk as the
final decision to act is left entirely up to the dam owner. The second method
still leaves critical safety management decisions to the dam owner, but at
least the downstream public is made aware of the risks and hazards that
they are voluntarily living under and provided with the opportunity for sal-
vation in the event of an emergency. Brown and Graham demonstrate that
through an analysis of deaths following major dam failures and flash floods,
effective warnings—through EAPs—can save lives.339 The third method
is the most reliable, as owners are required to account for their dam safety
management and comply with current acceptable practice, while their
decision-making is supervised by a regulatory authority.
Incorporating all three methods into a dam safety assurance policy
would provide maximum assurance to the public and would also represent
a best-practice model. At the same time, varying combinations of the three
methods may provide adequate assurance in certain circumstances. How-
ever, a reasonable minimum-level benchmark for areas where hazardous
dams exist would be for owners to always be educated and guided, and
downstream communities at least know the risks and hazards they are
living under. Therefore, a dam safety assurance policy should always
337 See id. at 63–64.
338 See id. at 38–39.
339 See Curtis A. Brown & Wayne J. Graham, Assessing the Threat to Life From Dam
Failure, 24 WATER RES. BULL. 1303, 1306 (1988); infra Figure 1.
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incorporate both the first and second methods in any area where hazard-
ous dams exist.
For example, in order to provide appropriate dam safety assurance
to downstream communities, it is not only necessary to educate private
dam owners regarding their responsibilities and liabilities in accordance
with the dictates of common law. It is also important to ensure downstream
communities are warned of the dangers they are living under and be pro-
vided the opportunity for rescue if disaster occurs. Then, depending on the
circumstances of particular jurisdictions, in particular the number of poten-
tially hazardous dams that exist at a point in time and the number that
are poorly managed, it may also be important to establish regulatory con-
trol and supervision over dam management practices. The aim here is to
ensure that owners manage their dams in line with current standards.
The main characteristics of each selected practice in Part II are
next analyzed comparatively to identify examples of “better” practice. In
turn, these are used to develop more detailed policy models and guidelines
for determining “appropriate” safety assurance policy for any jurisdiction.
The models comprise best practice and minimum practice as follows in the
proceeding parts.






340 Id. at 1307.
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IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: ELEMENTS OF “BEST PRACTICE” IN
PRIVATE DAM SAFETY ASSURANCE
The above international review indicates that the policy approaches
used to provide private dam safety assurance vary from one system to
another, and while there are a number of common features, each contains
certain unique elements, which may be considered as essential to best
practice. These elements are comparatively discussed in Parts IV.A to
IV.H. These elements together form a model of “best practice.” Part IV.I
then provides a summary of relevant key work undertaken by the World
Bank in 2002 entitled, Regulatory Frameworks for Dam Safety.341 This
summary supports many of the elements identified below and well acts
as a complement to the best practice policy model established here.
A. Federal/National Involvement
Out of the countries selected for review, Australia and Canada are
the only countries in which dam safety is not a federal/national issue.342
In these two countries, the responsibility of private dam safety is left en-
tirely up to the states.343 Although the United States’ format is similar,
this country has, in contrast, provided for significant federal initiative to
investigate and encourage private dam safety.344 The United States’ ap-
proach to achieving uniform dam safety policy under a federal system of
governance, which is similar to Australia, is one that works well;345 hence
a brief overview is warranted as follows.
In the early 1980s, the United States’ FEMA was assigned the
responsibility of coordinating and promoting dam safety in order to en-
courage the establishment and maintenance of effective state dam safety
programs.346 FEMA has since formed close relationships with the states
to provide such encouragement and has published a number of guide-
lines, one of the most significant of them being the Model State Dam Safety
Program, to help the states establish effective and efficient programs.347
341 DANIEL D. BRADLOW, ALESSANDRO PALMIERI & SALMAN M. A. SALMAN, THE WORLD
BANK, REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS FOR DAM SAFETY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (2002).
342 See supra Parts II.A, II.C.
343 See supra Parts II.A, II.C.
344 See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 225, at iii.
345 See A. Danilevsky, Dam Safety Legislation in the USA, WATER POWER & DAM CONSTR.,
Aug. 1993, at 24, 24–27.
346 Id. at 26.
347 See id.; see also FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 225, at iii.
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This model is in line with the Michigan practice reviewed above.348 As a
result of the added attention given to the states by FEMA, there was a sig-
nificant improvement in the control of dam safety practices throughout
the United States.349 A review of the state dam safety programs, conducted
by FEMA in 1992, found that forty-one states had adequate programs,
which met the minimum guidelines of the model program, and only two
states completely lacked a dam safety policy.350 However, the 1992 review
also discovered that many states with established acceptable programs
were unable to effectively implement the programs, mainly because of a
lack of funding to provide sufficient staff and administration.351 In brief,
less than twenty percent of the states were found to have a ratio of less
than 100 dams per full-time-equivalent staff member.352 For many of the
other states, this ratio was significantly higher, in some cases even being
over 1000 dams per staff member.353
In response to this problem, the federal government established the
National Dam Safety Program (“NDSP”), initially authorized under the
Water Resources and Development Act of 1996, and re-authorized most
recently (through to fiscal year 2011) under the Dam Safety Act of 2006.354
The NDSP includes the provision of grants to the states for the improve-
ment of state dam safety programs, but these grants are only distributed
among the states which successfully established dam safety programs
approved under the terms of the act, i.e., in line with the above model pro-
gram.355 As a result of the work of FEMA and the NDSP, all of the fifty
states, with the exception of Alabama, now have regulatory programs in
place for dam safety and participate in the NDSP.356 FEMA reports that
“[s]ince the National Dam Safety Program was first authorized more than
10 years ago, there have been [significant] improvements in the safety of
many of our Nation’s dams that are a [direct] result of National Dam
Safety Program funding for state assistance, training, and research.”357
The above approach from the United States shows that federal
involvement can work positively in obtaining national cooperation. It
348 See supra Part II.B.2.
349 See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 231, at xii.
350 Id.
351 Id.
352 Id. at xiii tbl.1.
353 Id.
354 See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 226, at 2.
355 See id. at 11–12.
356 Id. at 11.
357 Id. at 2.
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therefore sets a good example for Australia—and any other country with
a federal-style system of governance—to follow in order to encourage more
responsible state policies to be enacted, achieve more uniform dam safety
assurance policy across the country, and ensure more efficient and effective
administration of the policies.
B. Legislative Purposiveness358
All practices have created dam safety legislation either in the form
of specific or enabling legislation: Specific legislation—strict provisions
are established within a specific dam safety act, e.g., NSW, Michigan, and
Finland.359 Enabling legislation—certain provisions are incorporated within
existing water law enabling dam safety management to be regulated and
controlled, e.g., Victoria, Alberta, the United Kingdom, and South Africa.360
Michigan sets a good example in the manner in which it strictly and clearly
defines, under statute, most of the minimum standard requirements re-
lating to dams and their safety (including criteria on classifying dams,
frequency and thoroughness of inspections, flood capability, and EAPs),
thus removing any possibility for indecision.361 Tasmania similarly speci-
fies, under regulation, that all such aspects must satisfy ANCOLD stan-
dards; hence, it effectively establishes ANCOLD guidelines as a de facto
code of practice.362 Other dam safety legislation leaves such aspects to the
controlling authority’s discretion.363
In all of the practices except Washington state, the legislation pro-
vides a “quality assurance” (i.e., compliance audit) role, consistently plac-
ing the ultimate responsibilities and liabilities associated with private
dams upon their owners, in accordance with the dictates of common law.364
Under the “quality assurance” approach, government merely assures itself,
in the interest of public safety, that dam owners are taking responsible
358 Portions of Part IV.B are derived from Pisaniello, Ph.D. Thesis, supra note 27.
359 See supra Parts II.A.1, II.B.2, II.F.
360 See supra Parts II.A.2, II.C.2, II.D, II.E.
361 See supra Part II.B.2.
362 See supra Part II.A.3.
363 See, e.g., Memorandum from President Carter to The Sec’y of the Interior et al. (Apr. 23,
1977), in FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, FEDERAL GUIDELINES FOR DAM SAFETY 2 (2004)
(Presidential memorandum stating that each relevant federal agency head was responsible
for a specific aspect of dam safety and implementation).
364 See supra Part II.B; Dam Safety, WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, http://www.ecy.wa.gov/
programs/wr/dams/Inspections.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2011) (explaining that it is the
department’s job to make routine inspections to verify that dam construction is proceeding
as promised).
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steps to achieve adequate quality at all of the necessary phases associated
with dam safety.365 Washington State is an exception in the manner in
which it has adopted a “directed surveillance” approach rather than that
of the more common “quality assurance.”366 Under Washington legisla-
tion, the state has assumed responsibility for checking all stages of dam-
related activity, which includes mainly evaluating the adequacy of design,
inspecting structural adequacy, and supervising maintenance.367 While
this approach may provide the greatest assurance to the public, it is not
commonly adopted because of the following two significant problems:
1. A large number of adequate personnel, appropri-
ately trained in dam design review, are required
under the one state agency.368 Sowers suggests that
it is very difficult and expensive to find, train, and
maintain such personnel as engineering design re-
view “is seldom a challenging experience,” and “the
more imaginative [and] innovative engineers” be-
come quickly “bored and seek other employment.”369
2. By assuming responsibility for design checking and
approval and surveillance, it is logical that liability
is also assumed.370 It is most likely that, for this rea-
son, Washington law does not specifically address
owner or departmental liabilities. While an agency
can legislate for legal immunity as is apparent under
a similar system adopted in California,371 individual
liability could still prevail under the law of ordinary
negligence:
[E]ven though the law provides for immu-
nity, there is generally nothing that will pro-
hibit an injured citizen from suing a second
citizen if that second citizen has been neg-
ligent. Therefore, it may be possible for a
365 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 324.31517, 324.31518 (2010) (explaining that inspection
is the responsibility of the dam owner).
366 See supra Part II.B.3; Dam Safety, supra note 364.
367 See Dam Safety, supra note 364.
368 George F. Sowers, Dam Safety Legislation: A Solution or a Problem, in ENGINEERING
FOUNDATION CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS: SAFETY OF SMALL DAMS 65, 89–90 (1974).
369 Id. at 90.
370 See id. at 92.
371 Id.
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person who is injured by the failure of a
dam to sue the individuals employed by the
state agency although the agency itself may
be legally immune.372
Further guidance on how to best frame the purpose of dam safety
assurance regulation is provided in Part IV.I.
C. Administrative Enforcement and Funding
Responsibility for enforcing the legislation typically goes to some
federal/national or state water agency.373 However, the United Kingdom
and NSW are slight exceptions.374 The UK’s panel system is very simple
and avoids centralized and bureaucratic state control because administra-
tive responsibility rests mostly with independent engineers.375 The
system provides flexibility, avoids indecision, and facilitates rapid decision-
making; research shows this approach “has had a record the equal of that
under any other system.”376 NSW’s independent dam safety committee
system is also highly effective and operates with minimal funding.377 Ade-
quately funding the administration is critical to achieve effective and effi-
cient administration of the policy as demonstrated in Victoria and also the
United States.378 Funding the administration can be sourced through a
permit or license system, and Tasmania provides a good example of an
innovative user-pays system in this regard.379 Alternatively, NSW relies
solely on government funding and operates on a relatively modest annual
budget of AU $1 million; however, some user-pays would be required if
372 Id.
373 See, e.g., Dam Safety Overview, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR,
http://www.usbr.gov/ssle/damsafety/ (last updated Jan. 25, 2011) (example of a federal
agency responsible for enforcing dam safety legislation).
374 See Reservoirs Act, 1975, c. 23 (U.K.) (describing the United Kingdom’s panel system);
Dams Safety Act 1978 (N.S.W.) (Austl.) (describing NSW’s Dam Safety Committee).
375 See supra notes 294–305 and accompanying text (describing the 1975 Reservoirs Act).
376 MORRIS ET AL., supra note 9, at 7; Moffat, supra note 283, at 53.
377 See N.S.W. DAMS SAFETY COMM., supra note 110, at 3.
378 See supra Part II.B (describing Victoria’s proactive spillway testing and farm testing);
supra Part IV.A (describing the national Dam Inspection Program and FEMA as efficient
and effective administration).
379 See Water Management (Safety of Dams) Regulations 2003 (Tas.) s 13(1) (Austl.);
Pisaniello, How to Manage, supra note 27, at 367.
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the DSC extended its remit.380 Federal/national funding assistance is also
a good approach.381
D. Registration and Classification of “Applicable” Dams382
Most practices maintain a register of “applicable dams”383 using
a permit or licensing system.384 They also assign general hazard ratings
based on a three-level system such as that used in NSW.385 ANCOLD pro-
vides for some additional sub-classifications of hazard, which are deter-
mined on a more quantitative basis.386 Tasmania adopts the ANCOLD
approach to achieve more finite distinction between the levels of surveil-
lance and safety standards expected for different registered dams.387 This
ensures the dam safety management burdens imposed upon dam owners
are spread proportionally and equitably.
Typically, a minimum height and/or capacity is specified under
statute for standardizing which dams are registered and subject to the
legislation.388 The most conservative practices are Michigan, Tasmania,
Washington, and the United Kingdom, covering dams as low as 1.8 meters
and as small as one megaliter, twelve megaliters, and twenty-five mega-
liters, respectively.389 Also, Alberta’s 1998 amendments to the Dam and
Canal Safety Regulations of 1978 brought its criteria for licensing dams
more in line with these conservative practices.390 In fact, New Zealand
380 See N.S.W. DAMS SAFETY COMM., supra note 110, at 9.
381 See supra Part IV.A for a discussion on this approach.
382 Portions of Part IV.D are derived from Pisaniello, How to Manage, supra note 27.
383 I.e., dams subject to the provisions of the legislation.
384 See, e.g., CORPSMAPS NAT’L INVENTORY OF DAMS, http://geo.usace.army.mil/pgis/f?p=
397:1:2598971599601747 (last visited Jan. 25, 2011) (noting that the National Inventory
of Dams collects data from forty-nine states in which most dams are regulated by permits
via state agencies).
385 See, e.g., N.S.W. DAMS SAFETY COMM., supra note 108, at 9 (noting NSW’s three classi-
fications: high, significant, and low).
386 See supra Table 1.
387 See Water Management (Safety of Dams) Regulations 2003 (Tas.) ss 3–4 (Austl.).
388 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.31502 (2010); Water Management Act 1999 (Tas.)
s 165A (Austl.); WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, supra note 246, at 5; HEALTH & SAFETY EXEC.,
supra note 294.
389 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.31502 (2010); Water Management Act 1999 (Tas.) s 165A
(Austl.); WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, supra note 246, at 5; HEALTH & SAFETY EXEC., supra
note 294.
390 Alberta’s Dam and Canal Safety Regulations of 1978 originally only required dams
“higher than twenty-five feet (eight meters) or larger and fifty acre-feet (sixty ML
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will soon join the list of countries with dam safety assurance legisla-
tion.391 The New Zealand approach, which would have become effective
from July 1, 2010,392 is very similar to that of Tasmania and will regulate
dams as small as three meters high and with a minimum storage capacity
of only twenty megaliters.393 This demonstrates that more and more juris-
dictions are gradually recognizing the need to assure the safety of even
the smallest of dams.
In NSW and Finland, this size criterion is not as conservative and,
to compensate, is also based upon dam hazard potential.394 This “ensures
that [all] dams smaller than the specified size criterion [which have] sig-
nificant or high hazard potential [are] . . . included among those controlled”
while owners of small, low hazard potential dams are not burdened.395
However, in NSW, without a user-pays system, the DSA does not provide
for an adequate register of all dams (including small ones) in the state,
nor does it provide for an adequate budget to enable the DSC to super-
vise more dams than are already prescribed.396 In 2007, there were 334
prescribed dams in NSW, with only around 100 being privately owned.397
Hence, many smaller off-stream dams which are hazardous may only be
prescribed if and when they come to the attention of the DCS; otherwise,
they go unnoticed. This was clearly demonstrated in a recent study.398
While NSW has a strong dam safety assurance policy in place for
controlling its prescribed dams (i.e., ones that pose considerable individual
hazard), it “needs to address the considerable risks associated with cumu-
lative failure of small dams” in catchments.399 If small dams are located
upstream with potential to cause cascade failure of larger, more hazardous
dams, then ANCOLD warns that “the combined effect of multiple dam
[megaliters])” to be licensed, per section 1(c) of the original Regulations. See Pisaniello,
Ph.D. Thesis, supra note 27, at 67. But, after the 1998 amendments, this criteria was
reduced to higher than 2.5 meters or larger than thirty megaliters. See supra Part II.C.2.
391 See Dam Safety Scheme Deferred, N.Z. DEP’T OF BLDG. & HOUS., http://www.dbh.govt
.nz/dam-safety (last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
392 Id.
393 Dam Safety Review: Report of Findings of an Independent Review of the Dam Safety
Scheme, N.Z. DEP’T OF BLDG. & HOUS. (Apr. 14, 2010), http://www.dbh.govt.nz/dam-safety
-report#aid7.
394 See Pisaniello, Ph.D Thesis, supra note 27, at 92.
395 See id.
396 See Pisaniello, How to Manage, supra note 27, at 368.
397 See N.S.W. DAM SAFETY COMM., supra note 110, at 36.
398 Pisaniello, How to Manage, supra note 27, at 363–65.
399 Id. at 368. See supra Part II.A.
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failures should be the basis of the hazard category of the upper dams.”400
This guideline, interpreted strictly (and together with the recent research
in South Australia),401 would deem that in certain circumstances, all small
dams in a catchment upstream of a large, high-hazard public reservoir
should also be treated as high hazard (due to their potential cumulative
failure impact), and should therefore each individually meet the same
design standard.402 This area does require further research into the sort
of small-dam populations and overall storage volumes that are critical for
different catchment circumstances. However, it has nevertheless become
clear that all small dams in catchments of large public dams should be reg-
istered and at least controlled for spillway adequacy regardless of their size
and individual hazard potential.403 They should be mandated to at least
meet ANCOLD’s minimum fall-back design criteria for low hazard dams
(i.e., 1-in-100 to 1-in-1000 years design flood),404 and upgraded to a higher
standard when clearly warranted in cumulative or cascade failure scenar-
ios as per the Tasmanian approach.405 Capturing all such dams can only
be achieved by setting the registration cut-off to a very small size, as is the
case in Tasmania, Michigan, Washington, and the United Kingdom.406
E. Surveillance, Inspection, and Safety Reviews
Each practice provides for surveillance, inspection, and safety
reviews in order to ensure that owners maintain their dams in a safe
condition.407 Primary responsibility for dam safety rests with the dam
owner.408 Dam owners are required to arrange for a minimum level of
surveillance of their dams—the level depends on hazard potential—by
contracting experienced engineers and subsequently reporting all infor-
mation to the relevant enforcement authority.409 The authorities also
400 ANCOLD, CONSEQUENCES OF DAM FAILURE, supra note 22, at 10; Pisaniello, How to
Manage, supra note 27, at 363.
401 See LANGE DAMES CAMPBELL, supra note 34; Kazarovski, supra note 55.
402 See LANGE DAMES CAMPBELL, supra note 34, at 2–3.
403 See id.
404 See AUSTL. NAT’L COMM. ON LARGE DAMS, supra note 176, at 21.
405 See supra Part II.A.3.
406 See supra notes 388–89 and accompanying text.
407 See supra Part II (survey of the different dam safety assurance practices discussed in
this paper, with their policies for surveillance and inspection).
408 See supra Part IV.B.
409 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.31518 (2010) (Michigan statute directing dam owners
to contact professional engineers to conduct surveillance on their dams and reporting the
results is such an example).
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periodically conduct formal inspections to review surveillance informa-
tion.410 The more strict, frequent, and thorough a surveillance and inspec-
tion system is, the more effective it will be in reducing risk and increasing
safety assurance. Therefore, Michigan sets best practice in this regard with
requisite three-yearly and four-yearly surveillance for high and significant
hazard dams, respectively.411
As indicated above, the cumulative flood threats of catchment
dams should also be monitored. In this respect, Tasmania is the only state
in Australia to acknowledge that even small, low hazard dams need to be
supervised, albeit to a modest extent.412 Cost burdens to small dam owners
can be minimized by more finely varying the level of sophistication and
expertise required for surveillance and review activities according to dam
size and hazard potential413 and by making affordable design/review pro-
cesses, such as the simple pro-forma used in Tasmania,414 available and
the Pisaniello cost-effective flood capability design/review procedure.415
This is a good way that governments can ensure that not only the larger
potentially hazardous dams are kept safe, but also the cumulative safety
threats posed by small dams are kept in check.
F. Community Education and Preparedness416
Most practices provide for community education, awareness, and
preparedness through requiring EAPs for high and significant hazard
dams.417 This allows all people living downstream of potentially hazard-
ous dams to acknowledge the risks and hazards they are living under and
provides an opportunity for escape should failure occur. Such provision
is similar to the United States’ community right-to-know legislation,
which applies to hazardous uses or storage of chemicals.418 The EAPs are
410 See id.
411 Id.
412 See supra Part II.A.3.
413 See, e.g., supra Table 1.
414 See supra Part II.A.3.
415 See generally Pisaniello, Ph.D Thesis, supra note 27, at 112, 193–233 (development of
Pisaniello’s cost-effective flood capacity design/review procedure); Pisaniello, Argue &
McKay, supra note 82.
416 Portions of Part IV.F are derived from Pisaniello, Ph.D. Thesis, supra note 27.
417 See supra Part II (describing each practice and their individual EAPs, where applicable).
418 See Peter H. Sand, The Right to Know: Environmental Information Disclosure by
Government and Industry, in 2002 CONFERENCE ON “HUMAN DIMENSION OF GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: KNOWLEDGE FOR THE SUSTAINABILITY TRANSITION” 1, 4 (2002).
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required at varying levels for different dams depending on both their
size and hazard rating.419 For small remote dams, EAPs must include at
minimum a listing of all occupied facilities, buildings, and residences pos-
sibly threatened in the event of failure together with a basic description of
the intended actions of all parties involved.420 For larger, more hazardous
dams, more extensive plans, including the provision of detailed flood maps
and warning sirens, coordinated with the SES, must be expected. Finland
and South Africa also set good examples by establishing an enforced level
of owner responsibility by requiring maintenance of a special safety file
in an easily accessible location.421
The Tasmanian approach further satisfies the community right-
to-know principle through its permit application process for new dams.422
The permit process requires public advertisement of any new dam
proposals prior to any permit being granted.423 This enables the dam
safety authority to hear and consider any objections to the proposal from
the community.424
G. Punitive Enforcement425
Each statute attaches criminal liability and penalty to any owners
not complying with standard requirements, rules, directions, or regula-
tions specified or promulgated under statute.426 The somewhat intimidat-
ing criminal fines adopted in Michigan (maximum US $10,000 per day
of violation), or even those of South Africa or Tasmania, are appropriate
considering the possible consequences of dam failures.427
This paper refers to the United States’ federal Emergency Planning and Community Right-
to-Know Act, which established a Toxic Release Inventory, in addition to at least twenty-
five U.S. states’ “right-to-know” laws—the United States’ experience is what prompted
Australia to also establish the Pollutant Release and Transfer Register in the late 1990s.
Id. at 4–5.
419 Pisaniello, Ph.D Thesis, supra note 27, at 101.
420 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.31523 (2010) (strictly defining what information the
EAP must contain).
421 Patoturvallisuuslaki [Dam Safety Act] 1.6 1984/413 § 5 (Fin.); Dam Safety Regulations,
Government Notice (GN) R. 1560/1986 §§ 11.8-11.10 (S. Afr.).
422 See supra notes 160–62 and accompanying text.
423 See supra notes 160–62 and accompanying text.
424 See supra notes 160–62 and accompanying text.
425 Portions of Part IV.G are derived from Pisaniello, Ph.D. Thesis, supra note 27.
426 See supra Part II (describing criminal liability for violating dam safety requirements
of each statute, where applicable).
427 See MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 324.31524-324.31525 (2010); Water Management Act 1999
(Tas.) s 82 (Austl.); Water Act 36 of 1998 § 69 (S. Afr.).
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H. Owner Education and Guidance428
All practices provide for extensive owner education and guidance
through publication of guidelines to help owners understand the respon-
sibilities and liabilities associated with their dams in line with the law.429
This works positively in assuring private dam safety. Victoria provides
an excellent example of a guideline publication that well informs private/
farm dam owners, both hazardous and non-hazardous, on how to properly
manage their dams.430
I. A Review/Summary of the 2002 World Bank Publication of
Regulatory Frameworks for Dam Safety to Complement the
Best Practice Policy Model431
In 2002, the World Bank undertook a comprehensive comparative
study of dam safety regulations around the world and commissioned the
University of South Australia to contribute towards this work.432 This work
led to the publication entitled Regulatory Frameworks for Dam Safety.433
This sub-section reviews the Part 3: Essential Elements, Desirable Elements,
and Emerging Trends for Dam Safety, which is the principal part of this
important World Bank publication.434 The policy model of “best practice”
established by the above eight parts,435 in essence, incorporates the
World Bank’s “essential” and “desirable” elements436 of a regulatory
scheme, as is evident in the following summary. The following summary
therefore well complements the best practice policy model as it can be
used as an additional checklist, of regulatory elements in particular, when
any jurisdiction endeavors to develop a best practice private dam safety
assurance policy.
The fundamental premise of all existing, and any proposed, dam
safety regulatory scheme is that the dam owner is the person “responsible
for making the dam safe and for operating and maintaining it in a safe
428 Part IV.H is derived from Pisaniello, Ph.D. Thesis, supra note 27.
429 See supra Part II.
430 See VICT. DEP’T OF SUSTAINABILITY & ENV’T, supra note 132, at v.
431 See BRADLOW, PALMIERI & SALMAN, supra note 341. Portions of Part IV.I are derived
from Pisaniello, Ph.D. Thesis, supra note 27.
432 See id. at xi, 1.
433 Id.
434 See generally id. at 71–91.
435 See supra Parts IV.A–IV.H.
436 See generally BRADLOW, PALMIERI & SALMAN, supra note 341, at 71–91.
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condition. The regulator is responsible for protecting the safety of the
public by [(1)] establishing the dam safety standards . . . and [(2)] moni-
toring compliance [by the owners].”437
The “essential” and “desirable” elements discussed below are in-
tended to achieve this by (i) “clarify[ing] that the dam owner is [primarily]
responsible for dam safety and the regulators are responsible for monitor-
ing . . . performance in this regard” and (ii) specifying that owners have
responsibilities toward operations and maintenance and how owners
should review their dam, and “explain[ing] the ways in which the regula-
tory authority can perform its monitoring functions, which can include . . .
inspections” and penalties for non-complying owners.438
1. Essential Elements of a Regulatory Scheme
a. Clearly Articulated Laws
The regulatory structure is made up of clearly spelled out docu-
ments, publicly available, that stipulate in clear terms the responsibilities
above.439 The forms of these differ widely in the world.440 A national scheme
with national guidelines that a provincial government administers is a
good arrangement.
b. Clear Identification of Regulatory Agencies Involved, Clear
Power and Funding to Enforce the Regulations
The essential element here is to separate the agency from those
who make decisions about whether to build dams and from those who own
and/or operate dams.441 This regulatory separation of powers is a funda-
mental tenet of Australian water law and administration since the Council
of Australian Governments’ reforms of 1994.442
Adequate budget to operate laws are essential or the law becomes
meaningless. A clear requirement is a vote from Parliament. In NSW, such
is the case and the Dams Safety Committee operates in this way.443
437 Id. at 72–73.
438 Id. at 73.
439 Id.
440 See supra Part II (explaining the different acts that created dam oversight).
441 Id. at 74.
442 See JOHN TISDELL, JOHN WARD & TONY GRUDZINSKI, COOP. RESEARCH CENTRE FOR
CATCHMENT HYDROLOGY, REPORT 02/5, THE DEVELOPMENT OF WATER REFORM IN AUSTRALIA
29–30 (2002).
443 See supra Part II.A.1.
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c. Powers of the Regulatory Authority
These should include:
• Power to identify and enforce national norms.444
• A voice in the issue of permits.445
• Power to monitor inspection by others and to regu-
late the qualification of inspectors.446
• Power to conduct own inspections.447
• Power to approve the inspector selected by the
owner.448
• Responsibility to maintain a register of regulated
dams.449
• “Responsibility to advise dam owners and other
interested parties, such as affected communities,”
about dam safety issues.450
• Responsibility to make publicly available reports
on dam safety.451
• “Power to enforce the dam safety framework.”452
d. Content of the Scheme
“The regulatory scheme should include the following:”453
• Establishment of clear criteria for determining
which dams should be regulated, e.g., criteria
based on size and hazards created by the dam.454
• Address dam safety in a life cycle approach.455
• Clarification that owner is primarily responsible
but that the operator can be deemed the owner.456
444 BRADLOW, PALMIERI & SALMAN, supra note 341, at 75.
445 Id.
446 Id. at 76.
447 Id.
448 Id. at 77.
449 Id.
450 BRADLOW, PALMIERI & SALMAN, supra note 341, at 77.
451 Id. at 78.
452 Id.
453 Id. at 79.
454 Id.
455 Id. at 80.
456 BRADLOW, PALMIERI & SALMAN, supra note 341, at 80.
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• Stipulation of standards either international,
such as International Committee on Large Dams
(“ICOLD”), or locally based, such as ANCOLD.457
• Stipulation of periodic reports that owners must
supply to regulators with stipulation of frequency,
which may reflect characteristics such as life stage,
size, etc.458
• Owner must maintain complete records at a conve-
nient location.459
• Requirement that all dams have an operations main-
tenance manual and an adequate budget.460
• Imposition of fees by the regulatory authority that
cover the cost of dam safety activities of the regula-
tory authority.461
• Requirement of an emergency plan for high hazard
dams, as implemented in NSW.462
2. Desirable Attributes of Regulatory Scheme
This list covers items in addition to the ones above; many of these
are aspirational:
• Dam safety agency exclusively devoted to dam
safety.463
• Dam safety advisory committee with a skill base of
“technical experts and representatives of affected”
communities.464
• Dam safety agency which has overarching coordi-
nation roles.465
457 Id. at 82. See, e.g., International Commission on Large Dams, WORLD WATER COUNCIL,
http://www.worldwatercouncil.org/index.php?id=1511 (last visited Jan. 25, 2011); AUSTL.
NAT’L COMM. ON LARGE DAMS, http://www.ancold.org.au/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
458 BRADLOW, PALMIERI & SALMAN, supra note 341, at 80.
459 Id. at 83.
460 Id. at 84.
461 Id.
462 Id. at 85.
463 Id. at 86.
464 BRADLOW, PALMIERI & SALMAN, supra note 341, at 86.
465 Id.
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• Power for periodic inspection by the dam safety
agency of all hazardous dams with technical ar-
chives of the dam available to the agency.466
• Dam licenses require a failure impact assessment
with regard to communities, property, and the
environment.467
• Benchmarks developed to measure dam safety at
all dams and these be broadly based including
“structural, environmental, social, health, and
economic factors.”468
• Periodic review by dam owner of all dams to test
compliance with the regulatory authority who also
has the power to conduct these itself.469
• Annual reports on dam safety.470
• Education activities implemented.471
V. ELEMENTS OF “MINIMUM PRACTICE” IN PRIVATE DAM SAFETY
ASSURANCE472
The above elements together set “best practice,” but countries or
states with less critical circumstances (i.e., smaller populations and/or
fewer aging, hazardous dams) may consider it sufficient to only adopt
certain aspects of this model to varying degrees. Nevertheless, there are
certain critical elements which should prevail in any system where poten-
tially hazardous dams exist in order to provide some minimal level of
deserved safety assurance to downstream communities: these were estab-
lished generally by a minimum level benchmark in Part III, above. These
elements are now developed further in practical terms, and together they
form a model of “minimum practice.”
A. Dams Registration and Classification473
Require local authorities (e.g., local councils) to: (i) maintain a
register of dams (based on, for example, Michigan, Tasmania, or the
466 Id.
467 Id. at 87.
468 Id.
469 Id. at 88.
470 BRADLOW, PALMIERI & SALMAN, supra note 341, at 88.
471 Id.
472 Part V derived from Pisaniello, Ph.D. Thesis, supra note 27.
473 Part V.A derived from Pisaniello, Ph.D. Thesis, supra note 27.
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United Kingdom’s size criteria), within each of their jurisdictions, and
(ii) assign subjective hazard ratings based on NSW’s three-level hazard
rating system. This at least provides a database for governments to moni-
tor the density of potentially hazardous dams and also the seriousness
of the “cumulative” dam safety problem in catchments as downstream
areas develop.
B. Community Education and Preparedness474
Establish community right-to-know provisions as amendments
under existing water legislation, requiring all owners of hazardous dams
to provide EAPs. The required level of EAPs should depend on the size
and hazard rating of the dam, with minimum requirements similar to
those set under Michigan or NSW law.475 Naturally, powers must be given
to some existing water authority, with staff experienced in emergency
planning, to initially enforce this provision, with severe penalties for non-
compliance. Subsequent responsibility for simple periodic checks to ensure
the plans are continuously updated and maintained can then be delegated
to local councils.
C. Owner Education and Guidance476
Provide for owner education and guidance to strongly encourage
surveillance and maintenance of dams by producing and promoting
numerous publications similar to those in Victoria or NSW.477
VI. GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTING “APPROPRIATE” PRIVATE DAM
SAFETY ASSURANCE POLICY478
As indicated above, the model of minimum practice should prevail
in any system where potentially hazardous dams exist in order to provide
some minimal level of deserved safety assurance to downstream commu-
nities. But, with the model of best practice in private dam safety assur-
ance also established, the key question becomes: how many potentially
474 Part V.B derived from Pisaniello, Ph.D. Thesis, supra note 27.
475 See supra Parts II.A.1 and II.B.2 (NSW and Michigan both require EAPs of varying
degrees depending on the hazard rating of the dam).
476 Part V.C derived from Pisaniello, Ph.D. Thesis, supra note 27.
477 See supra Parts II.A.1, II.A.2.
478 Portions of Part VI are derived from Pisaniello, Ph.D. Thesis, supra note 27.
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hazardous private dams does a jurisdiction need to contain to necessitate
a move towards a model of best practice? This question can be answered
via the following simple, implicit analysis.
Each of the international jurisdictions analyzed above, with the
exception of South Australia, have implemented a dam safety assurance
policy that is either in line with the best practice model or has substantial
coincidence with it.479 Hence, by comparing the density of potentially haz-
ardous private dams contained in some of the jurisdictions at the time of
policy implementation,480 a precedent guide may be established as to when
it is appropriate to move towards the model of best practice. This analysis/
comparison is discussed below.
• In NSW, information on how many hazardous pri-
vate dams existed when the Dams Safety Act 1978
was implemented is not readily available. Neverthe-
less, in 1995, there were a total of 236 prescribed
dams (i.e., hazardous dams) on the DSC’s register,
and of these, sixty-five were privately owned dams.481
There are currently around 100 such privately
owned dams.482 Given this growth rate over the
years, it is reasonable to assume that in 1978, the
number of hazardous private dams on the register
would have been less than or equal to sixty-five.
• In Victoria, the recent farm dam safety policy
reforms resulted from estimates of there being
some 300,000 farm/private dams in the state, and
around 1000 of these were considered potentially
hazardous.483
• When Tasmania implemented its 2003 dam safety
reforms, there were approximately 5600 registered
dams in the state.484 This has recently grown to
around 8000: 500 of these are hazardous and some
350 of these are privately owned (Part II.A.2).485
479 See supra Parts IV.A–IV.H (comparing the different dam safety assurance policies dis-
cussed throughout this article and measuring them up to best practice policies).
480 The density of hazardous private dams at some point in time post-implementation may
still provide some useful guidance.
481 N.S.W. DAMS SAFETY COMM., ANNUAL REPORT 1994/95, at 31 (1995).
482 N.S.W. DAMS SAFETY COMM., supra note 110, at 37–41.
483 See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.
484 WATER RES. DIV., TAS. DEP’T OF PRIMARY INDUS., WATER & ENV’T, supra note 206, at 21.
485 See supra notes 209–12 and accompanying text.
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• Michigan, in the late 1980s, identified 796 non-
federal dams in a state inventory, and of these,
approximately 330 were either high or significant
hazard—this led to implementation of the Dam
Safety Act, PA 300 of 1989.486
• Information on the number of hazardous privately
owned dams that existed in Washington at the time
its dam safety policy was first implemented is not
readily available, but by July 2003, 940 dams were
regulated by the DSO.487 About 330 of the 940 dams
are hazardous, and of these 140 are small dams less
than 4.6 meters in height—given their small size, it
would be reasonable to assume that most of these
140 dams are privately owned.488
• In the United Kingdom in 1982, a study identified
over 1500 dams of considerable size warranting
regulatory control.489 Of these, 190 had no recorded
owner; hence, most, if not all of these, 190 dams
must have been private dams that escaped supervi-
sion under the old dam safety policy.490 This demon-
strated the seriousness of the dam safety problem
in the country, which later led to the implementation
of the Reservoirs Act 1975.491
• South Africa, in the mid-1980s, implemented
strong enabling dam safety legislation and associ-
ated regulations in response to the growing number
of privately owned dams evident throughout the
country.492 Information on the number of hazard-
ous privately owned dams that existed at the time
is not readily available, but by the mid-1990s, 1420
hazardous dams were in existence, and of these,
486 See supra notes 231–32 and accompanying text.
487 See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
488 See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
489 See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
490 Charnock, supra note 286, at 18.
491 Reservoirs Act, 1975, c. 23 (U.K.); see supra Part II.C.3.
492 See Water Amendment Act 96 of 1984 (S. Afr.) (repealed 1998, current legislation
National Water Act 36 of 1998 (S. Afr.)).
574 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 35:515
1150 were privately owned.493 It would be reason-
able to assume that a considerable proportion of
these dams existed at the time the legislation was
implemented.
From the above analysis and comparison, it is difficult to identify a
systematic relationship, especially as information on density of hazardous
private dams at the time of policy implementation is not always available,
and the policies implemented in the above cases may not have been the
direct result of private dam safety considerations only. Nevertheless, a
simple generic precedent can be identified as follows: if a country or State
has more than sixty-five potentially hazardous private dams and/or more
than, for example, 200 potentially hazardous dams in total (i.e., including
public dams), then a dam safety assurance policy in line with the best
practice model is warranted (as set by NSW practice).494 Cases which fall
well below the cut-off criteria within this precedent should be dealt with
under the provisions of the model of minimum practice, and as circum-
stances draw closer toward this cut-off criteria, some additional elements
from the best practice model should be developed.
VII. SUMMARY OF LESSONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND POLICY GUIDANCE
Improperly managed structures with considerable safety risks are
associated with large and small dams, high and low hazard.495 Such risks
arise at the individual and cumulative level within catchments and are
magnified by the attitudes, behaviors, and practices of dam owners and
the responses of policy makers, demonstrated here by both overseas and
local experiences with dam failures and the South Australian case study.496
493 See Pisaniello, Ph.D Thesis, supra note 27, at 80.
494 This refers to the total number of potentially hazardous private dams contained within
a country or state. For primary exploration, “potentially hazardous dams” can be taken
as those which are significant in size and individually pose either a high or significant
hazard potential, e.g., in line with NSW or ANCOLD classifications. See supra Part IV.D.
Secondary consideration should then also be given to smaller catchment dams that pose
considerable cumulative flood threats within catchments as discussed in Part I.A. See
Pisaniello, How to Manage, supra note 27, at 363. The government would have to establish
an inventory of all such dams in a region, if one is not already in place, which is required
anyway under the model of minimum practice. See Pisaniello, Ph.D. Thesis, supra note
27, at 117.
495 See Pisaniello & Burritt, supra note 36, at 20.
496 See supra Parts I-II (discussing different countries’ and states’ reactions to dam failures
and the steps that have been taken to prevent future failures).
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A summary of the comparative lessons to be learnt from the reviews of
the selected Australian practices are provided below. Policy implications
and associated guidance for Australia in particular, and the world in
general, follow.
A. Summary of Lessons from the Reviewed Australian Practices497
In SA, it is evident that complacency best describes the attitudes
of farm dam owners.498 Previous studies point to a gross underestimate of
the importance of a dam’s spillway and dam safety in general.499 Policy-
makers also seem complacent in that despite research and warnings the
relevant government authorities are reactive in their policy responses.500
This approach is tantamount to waiting for a disaster to happen and does
not set a good example.
NSW and Victoria set good examples. Their proactive policies move
in the direction of the best practice model and provide adequate manage-
ment of dam safety risks.501 However, the policies are not thorough enough
and only address those problems associated with hazardous dams (usually
larger, significant dams) without adequately considering problems linked
to the many smaller dams.502 Farmers need to be supervised to ensure ade-
quate safety management of dams. Specifically, all farm dams in catch-
ments of large public dams should be registered and controlled for at least
spillway adequacy regardless of size and hazard potential. This is essential
if cumulative disaster threats are to be effectively reduced and managed.
They should be mandated to at least meet ANCOLD’s fall-back design
criteria for low hazard dams (1-in-100 to 1-in-1000 years design flood).503
Overall, the registration of dams, extensive supervisory remit for author-
ities, provision of sufficient funding for extended supervisory remit, and
efficient and effective administration of the policy are all needed.
Tasmanian policy represents the Australian jurisdiction most in line
with the best practice model and sets a good example for the other states
to follow.504 Tasmania provides an innovative and equitable user-pay
497 Portions of Part VII.A are derived from Pisaniello, How to Manage, supra note 27;
Pisaniello, Ph.D. Thesis, supra note 27; Pisaniello & Burritt, supra note 36.
498 See supra Part I.B.
499 See supra notes 80–86 and accompanying text.
500 See supra notes 69–79 and accompanying text.
501 See supra Parts II.A.1, II.A.2.
502 See supra Parts II.A.1, II.A.2.
503 See supra note 404 and accompanying text.
504 See WATER RES. DIV., TAS. DEP’T OF PRIMARY INDUS., WATER & ENV’T, supra note 206,
at 21.
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method for governments to fund extensive dam supervision.505 It also pro-
vides a user-friendly one-stop-shop for new dams and considers other im-
portant dam safety issues such as community feedback, sustainable water
allocation, and environmental impact.506 Nonetheless, additional funding
and staffing to achieve more timely administration of Tasmania’s policy
may be required. According to feedback from the regulatory authority,
much time, effort, and resources are needed to identify all existing dams
in Tasmania that should be included on the register, and to ensure they
comply with the policy.507 This has led to implementing a priority system
in terms of strict enforcement of standards, which could potentially allow
many smaller dams that contribute to cumulative threats to go unchecked
for too long.508
B. Policy Implications and Guidance for Australia and Abroad
The policy implications for the Australian states reviewed comprise:
• In policy deficient SA, there is clearly a need for a
model of best practice based on application of the
policy precedent and guidelines in Part VI. This is
because SA has at least 100 individually hazard-
ous private dams and thousands of smaller, lower
hazard dams posing significant cumulative safety
threats in catchments.509 Policy options include
(1) providing for empowering legislation via amend-
ments under the NRMA so that an existing author-
ity can be empowered to regulate and supervise dam
safety similar to the Tasmanian system, or (2) estab-
lishing a specific dam safety act and authority simi-
lar to the NSW approach, but providing for a more
extensive supervision than currently is the case in
NSW.
• In NSW, the policy via the DSA and DSC is already
strong.510 However, the NSW government should:
firstly, establish a more extensive register of dams;
505 See supra notes 191–95 and accompanying text.
506 See supra Part II.A.3.
507 See supra Part II.A.3.
508 See supra Part II.A.3.
509 See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text.
510 See supra Part II.A.1 (describing the dam safety policy of NSW).
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and secondly, extend the DSC’s supervisory remit
and funding support so that each of the concerns
in Part I.A are addressed. Cost-effective spillway
design/review procedures and simple supervisory
pro forma (e.g., from Tasmania) for smaller dams
should also be put to use in NSW given the avail-
ability of such options.
• In Victoria, the recently developed policy is well-
positioned but requires improvement in some key
areas.511 Victoria is currently reviewing its policy
to identify any necessary improvements, and this
should result in the regulator recognizing the need
for additional funding to achieve more efficient and
effective administration of the policy.512 Victoria
should also consider extending its register to include
dams smaller than the current referable criteria (in
line with the Tasmanian approach) in order to en-
sure that the cumulative threats associated with
smaller catchment dams are kept in check. For such
dams, currently available cost-effective spillway
design/ review procedures and simple supervisory
pro forma (e.g., from Tasmania) should also be put
to use in Victoria.
• In Tasmania, the policy is comprehensive, well ad-
dressing each of the concerns in Part I.A and repre-
sents an exemplary model of best practice.513 Any
additional funding and support needed to facilitate
more timely administration of the policy could be
sourced from farmers under the user-pays system
or it could be subsidized directly by the state gov-
ernment. But, perhaps it should come from the
Commonwealth government and be made available
to all states as discussed below.
The major implication of these findings for Australia is that there
is a need for more uniform dam safety assurance policies nationally.
Policies must ensure that communities and environments downstream
511 See supra Part II.A.2 (describing the dam safety policy of Victoria).
512 See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
513 WATER RES. DIV., TAS. DEP’T OF PRIMARY INDUS., WATER & ENV’T, supra note 206, at 21.
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of hazardous private dams are valued equally, regardless of the state in
which they exist. This accords with ANCOLD’s ongoing encouragement
since 1972 for Australian states to implement uniform dam safety legis-
lation.514 As demonstrated by this paper, despite many studies, warnings,
and encouragement over recent decades, uniform policy in Australia is
yet to be achieved. Federal government involvement in Australia is an
option that should be encouraged.515 Under the Australian Constitution,
the Commonwealth Parliament is empowered to grant money to any state
“on such terms and conditions as the Parliament thinks fit.”516 This can
be in the form of “specific purpose grants,” also known as the “tied grants”
tool—since granting is tied to a particular purpose—commonly used by
the federal parliament as an incentive or “carrot” to influence state policy
matters in order to achieve uniform policy nationally.517 The Common-
wealth could therefore provide monetary support/incentives to the states
on the condition that their dam safety assurance policy meets an interna-
tional benchmark standard, such as the guidelines in Part VI. The level of
support given to each state would depend on the number of dams requiring
supervision. This approach is similar to that of the United States, which
has been adopted successfully since the early 1980s.518
The strategy adopted in the United States shows that federal in-
volvement can work positively in obtaining national cooperation.519 It is a
good example for Australia to follow because it encourages the enactment
of more responsible state policies, achieves a more uniform dam safety
assurance policy across the country, and ensures that policies are better
administered. In other words, effectively implemented policy in each state
will meet an acceptable international benchmark or standard such as that
established in this paper.520
Internationally, this paper has shown that many countries and
jurisdictions have enacted dam safety assurance policies that are workable
514 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
515 See supra Part IV.A.
516 AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 96.
517 TONY BLACKSHIELD & GEORGE WILLIAMS, AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND
THEORY: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 909, 911, 919, 923, 925 (3d ed. 2002); see Scott
Bennett, Feature Article: Australian Federal System, AUSTL. BUREAU OF STATISTICS, http://
www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Previousproducts/1301.0Feature%20Article4012008
?opendocument&tabname=Summary&prodno=1301.0&issue=2008&num=&view= (last
updated Jun. 3, 2010).
518 See supra Part IV.A (describing the work of FEMA in creating federal dam safety
guidelines for states to adopt).
519 See supra Part IV.A.
520 See supra Parts III, VI for discussion about these benchmarks and standards.
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and not too costly for governments to implement and dam owners to com-
ply with.521 In Parts III through VI, comparative analysis of these policies,
and selection of key elements of “best” and “minimum” practice amongst
each, have enabled development of policy guidelines compromising the
benchmarks and models of “best” and “minimum” practice and associated
selection criteria. Hence, these guidelines are in line with international
experience and best practice; their application has been illustrated with the
South Australian case study above. Any country or jurisdiction worldwide
can refer to the benchmarks, models, and guidelines in Parts III through
VI, as well as the lessons and implications provided above, to check the
appropriateness of their current dam safety policy and how best to devise
any necessary improvements.
CONCLUSION522
There is a clear need in states with hazardous private dams to
ensure that owners review and maintain their dams in line with current
acceptable practice. This includes the owners of smaller private dams,
because such dams do pose considerable individual and/or cumulative
safety threats to downstream communities and the environment in catch-
ments.523 Adequate assurance can only be provided through the implemen-
tation of appropriate policy, which requires the backing of lawmakers.
The comparative review, policy/law models, and guidance presented here
should encourage such backing in Australia, especially for SA, which cur-
rently has no policy, and also in any other policy-deficient jurisdiction
worldwide with hazardous private dams. Federal involvement and back-
ing can also assist to achieve uniform dam safety assurance throughout
a country.524 In particular, the following elements are vital for programs to
succeed in managing both individual and cumulative dam safety threats:
registration of all dams, extensive supervisory capacity for authorities,
adequate funding including equitable user-pays principle, and effective
and efficient administration.
The comparative review demonstrates that the approaches and
standards used vary, but that there are also a number of common features
and that none of the practices is perfect—some contain elements which
521 See supra Part II (describing various dam safety practices worldwide with key elements
of best practices).
522 Portions of the Conclusion are derived from Pisaniello, How to Manage, supra note 27.
523 See id. at 361.
524 See supra Part IV.A.
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are superior to others, thereby setting a good example even though they
may be deficient in other areas. Nevertheless, the key lesson is that in
order to provide appropriate dam safety assurance to downstream commu-
nities, it is necessary to educate private dam owners so they realize their
responsibilities and liabilities in accordance with the dictates of common
law, and also to establish some form of regulatory supervision and control
over dam management practices to ensure that owners appropriately man-
age their dams in line with current standards. The review shows this can
be best achieved by establishing properly organized, systematic dam safety
programs based on dam safety legislation. At the very least, considering
downstream communities ultimately bear the risks associated with dams,
they should have the right to know the potential dangers they are living
under and be provided with opportunity for salvation (should failure occur)
through appropriate emergency preparedness procedures required under
legislation. Hence, for SA, which has a considerable number of hazardous
private dams compared to the other practices reviewed, the elements of
“minimum practice” should, at the very least, be implemented immediately,
with the additional elements of “best practice” to follow soon thereafter.
This approach525 provides guidance to any other jurisdiction worldwide
with potentially hazardous private dams for either checking current policy
or to develop new policy.
The experience of Tasmania, which provides an exemplar of the
“best practice” model, is similar to what is happening internationally in
that appropriately devised dam safety programs are workable and not too
costly. Elements of best practice do exist successfully whereby the proper
safety management of hazardous private dams, both at the individual and
cumulative levels within catchments, provides increased dam safety assur-
ance to the public. The ideals of reducing loss of life as well as containing
environmental and economic losses are consequently being promoted.
525 I.e., determining appropriate legislative arrangements for SA using comparative
jurisdictional circumstances and the developed policy/law models.
